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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three studies on game theory. In the rst study, we
examine a sequential matching problem. In particular, we study preference restrictions
to implement stable matchings in the equilibrium. In the second study, we propose a
solution concept for the roommate problem. In the third study, we analyze the e¤ects of
transportation costs on regional and multilateral trade agreements.
On Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matchings
This study investigates subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in
a sequential matching mechanism. We identify some "ring" conditions on the domain
of preferences that are necessary and su¢ cient for the unique, men and women optimal
stable matchings to be implementable in the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the
sequential mechanism. We also investigate how these ring conditions are related to the
Eckhout (Econ Lett, 2000) and M (Suh and wen, 2008) conditions.. We introduce the No-
ring-by-which-stable-matching-partners-are-swapped condition, which is weaker than the
Eeckhout condition, and show that it is not only su¢ cient as the Eeckhout condition, but
also necessary for the existence of a unique stable matching and for the unique stable
matching to be in the SPE. We propose the No-ring-by-which-men-swap-optimal-partners
condition and prove that it is both necessary and su¢ cient for the men-optimal stable
matching to be in the SPE of the mechanism when men move rst. Moreover, it is equivalent
to the M condition. Hence, we prove that the M condition is not only su¢ cient but also
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necessary for the men-optimal stable matching to be the SPE outcome of the mechanism
when men move rst.
A Solution for the Roommate Problem and A Sequential Matching
Mechanism
The study has two parts: In the rst part, we propose a solution concept for the
roommate problem, and in the second part, we focus on a sequential roommate problem.
The solution concept is related to the P   stability concept (Inarra et al, 2008) and is
called RP   stability (reduced preference prole P   stability). Similar to P   stability,
an RP   stable matching always exists. Moreover, whenever a Pareto improvement is
possible in a P   stable matching, RP   stable matching provides a Pareto improvement.
Furthermore, the number of matched individuals in an RP   stable matching is always
greater than or equal to the number of those in any P   stable matching. We introduce a
procedure, which is called the RP procedure, to obtain the set of RP   stable matchings.
In the second part, we focus on a sequential roommate problem and analyze the subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this problem. First, we show that the set of all potential SPE
outcomes can be identied by the RP procedure. Second, we identify a su¢ cient condition
to guarantee the pairwise stability of the SPE outcome of the sequential game regardless
of the order of individuals in solvable roommate problems, i.e., roommate problems with
stable solutions.
Regional versus Multilateral Trade Agreements: A Welfare Analysis
Why are trade agreements mostly regional? By making a welfare analysis, we
show that the existence of transportation costs may be a possible reason. In particular,
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we set up a model of N countries by considering the e¤ects of transportation costs on the
welfare of each country. We also consider the relative size of the countries in our analysis
together with measures of comparative advantage. We rst show that the optimal tari¤
rates are decreasing in transportation costs; i.e., closer countries tend to have higher tari¤
rates between each other, which implies a potential gain from regional agreements. After
that, we make a welfare analysis by using a stationary dynamic tari¤ game approach and
show that it is harder to make an agreement for countries if the transportation cost is
higher; i.e., countries tend to sustain regional agreements to maximize their welfare.
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CHAPTER II
ON SUBGAME PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF STABLE MATCHINGS
Introduction
A two-sided matching problem considers, in general, two sets of agents, X and Y,
and the allocation of X among Y "and" Y among X. For example, a hospital-intern problem
is a matching problem that allocates open positions in hospitals among interns and interns
among hospitals. If an intern is matched to a hospital, then the hospital is matched to the
intern. Hence, the exchange in the problem is naturally bilateral. In this paper, we focus
on what is known as the marriage problem, in which two sets of agents are said to be men
and women, and each individual can be matched (i.e., married) at most one individual of
the opposite sex.1
A matching is individually rational if there is no individual who prefers to be
unmatched (i.e., being single or alone) rather than being matched to the his or her partner
under the matching. Two individuals block a matching if they prefer to be matched to
each other rather than being matched to their partners under the matching. A matching is
stable if it is not blocked by any individual or pair of individuals. Gale and Shapley (1962)
proved the existence of a stable matching in a marriage problem through the deferred
acceptance algorithm, which always nds a stable matching. They also showed that when
men propose in their algorithm, every man likes the resulting matching as much as any other
stable matching; this matching is called the men-optimal stable matching, M . Similarly,
1See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive review on two-sided matching problems.
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when women propose in the deferred acceptance algorithm, every woman likes the resulting
matching as much as any other stable matching; this matching is called the women-optimal
stable matching, W . Hereafter, we will state denitions and results only for men as similar
denitions and results can be obtained by switching men and womens roles.
In this paper, we focus on the implementation of M and the unique stable match-
ing (when there is one) as the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) outcomes of a sequential
matching mechanism. Hereafter, we refer to this mechanism as the sequential matching
mechanism (SM-mechanism). In a SM-mechanism, men and women move sequentially ac-
cording to a previously specied order. An individual can choose one of three possible
actions when it is his or her turn to move: (i) Accept a proposal which has been made to
himself or herself at a previous stage, or (ii) propose to a potential partner who moves at
a later stage, or (iii) choose to remain single. The mechanism in which men move before
women is called the men-move-rst mechanism.
One may expect that the SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism is a stable matching
regardless of the order of individualsmoves. However, the stability of the equilibrium
outcome is not guaranteed without further restrictions on the preference domain. This paper
is motivated by such restrictions to implement stable matchings in the SPE. In particular,
this paper aims to answer two questions: 1) Under which conditions are M , W , and the
unique stable matching implementable in the SPE of the SM-mechanism regardless of which
order the individuals move in, and 2) how are these conditions related to other conditions
such as the Eeckhout condition (Eeckhout, 2000) and the alpha conditions (Suh and Wen,
2008), which are previously considered in the context of implementing M , and the unique
stable matching?
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First, we explain our motivation for the rst question and highlight the related
literature. Our objective regarding the rst question is to nd necessary and su¢ cient
conditions to implement M and the unique stable matching. We are particularly interested
in nding "ring" conditions. An ordered set of men and women is a (strict) ring if they
can be arranged in a circle with men-women couples alternating such that each individual
prefers the next person in the circle (e.g., clockwise) to the one who precedes him or her.
We are interested in ring conditions (i.e., condition that are dened in terms of certain types
of rings in the preference prole) because there is a close relation between stable matchings
and rings in a preference prole. For example, in a more general matching problem, which is
called the roommate problem, a stable matching may not exist. The relation between stable
matchings and rings become more obvious in roommate problems because the existence of
stable matching is directly related to the existence of some certain type of rings. We observe
that the close relation between rings and stable matchings also play an important role in
implementing stable matchings context. By exploring this relation, we are able to identify
two ring conditions: The No-ring-by-which-stable-matching-partners-are-swapped (NRS)
condition, and the No-ring-by-which-men-swap-optimal-partners (NRMO) condition. A
preference prole satises the NRS condition if and only if there is no ring such that each
man and the woman who precedes him are partners in a stable matching or each woman and
the man who precedes her are partners in a stable matching . A preference prole satises
the NRMO condition if and only if there is no ring such that each man and the woman who
precedes him are partners in the men-optimal stable matching. The rst objective of this
paper is to show that the NRS condition is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for there
to be a unique stable matching and for the unique stable matching to be implementable as
the SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism regardless of the order of individuals. Similarly,
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we show that the NRMO condition is necessary and su¢ cient to implement M as the SPE
outcome of the SM-mechanism regardless of the order of individuals in the men-move-rst
mechanism.
Now, we explain our motivation for the second question. Our objective is to
understand how our ring conditions are related to Eeckhouts condition (Eeckhout, 2000),
which we refer as the Eeckhout condition hereafter, and the alpha-men (M ) and alpha-
women (W ) conditions (Suh and Wen, 2008). A preference prole satises the Eeckhout
condition if and only if men and women can be ordered such that each man (woman) prefers
the woman (man) with the same index to all women (men) with higher indices. A preference
prole satises the M condition if and only if men and women can be ordered such that
each man prefers the woman with the same index to all women with higher indices, and if
a man prefers a woman with a lower index to the woman with the same index as himself,
then he must be preferred less by the woman with the lower index to the man with the
same lower index. We focus on the Eeckhout condition and the M condition because, as
far as we know, these are the only conditions that are previously considered in the context
of implementing stable matchings. We show that the NRMO condition is an equivalent
ring condition of the M condition. Hence, we also prove that the M condition is not
only su¢ cient (Suh and Wen, 2008), but also a necessary condition for M to be the SPE
outcome of the men-move-rst mechanism regardless of the order of moves. Furthermore,
we analyze how the NRS condition and the Eeckhout condition are related. We show that
the NRS condition is weaker then the Eeckhout condition.
The reason for our interest in ring conditions is the close relation between stable
matchings and rings in a preference prole. There are very important studies in the litera-
ture which show particular interest in the relation between rings and stable matchings. For
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example, Chung (2000) identies a condition, called the no odd ringscondition, that is
su¢ cient for the existence of a stable matching when preferences are not necessarily strict
in the roommate problems.2 Another study is by Irving and Leather (1986) who propose an
algorithm to compute all stable matchings in a marriage problem. In this algorithm, a sta-
ble matching is obtained by breaking a marriage in another stable marriage and satisfying
a subset of identied agents that form a cycle.3 Rings play an important role in Gales Top
Trading Cycles algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) which is used to nd the unique core
allocation in the context of housing markets, in the YRMH-IGYT (you request my house-I
get your turn) mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) which is a generalization of
Gales Top Trading Cycles algorithm, and in the Top Trading Cycles and Chains mechanism
(Roth, Sonmez, and Unver, 2004) which is used to solve the kidney exchange problem.
In terms of implementation of stable matchings, one close study is by Suh and Wen
(2008). In their paper, Suh and Wen show that the condition proposed by Eeckhout (2000),
which guarantees the uniqueness of the stable matching as Eeckhout proves, is a su¢ cient
condition for the unique stable matching to be implementable in the SPE for any order
of individualsmoves. They also prove that the uniqueness of the stable matching is not
su¢ cient to implement the unique stable matching in the SPE for any order of individuals
moves. The M condition is proved to be a su¢ cient condition for the men-optimal stable
matching to the in the SPE of any men-move rst mechanism by Suh and Wen (2008).
They also note that the Eeckhout condition implies the M and W conditions, but the
reverse is not true.
2A roommate problem is a one-sided matching problem, i.e, there is only one set of agents. A marriage
problem is a special case of a roommate problem. In a roommate problem, the existence of a stable matching
is not guaranteed.
3Irving and Leather (1986), Abulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999), and Roth, Sonmez, and Unver (2004) use
the term "cycle" instead of the term "ring".
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Another close study is Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2005) who study the imple-
mentation of the student-optimal stable matching in the SPE. In their study, they pro-
pose the students-sequentially-propose-and-colleges-choose mechanism and show that the
student-optimal stable matching is the SPE outcome when collegespreferences are substi-
tutive.4 Their mechanism is equivalent to the men-move-rst mechanism with a capacity
constraint imposed on women. Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2005) also argue that a sym-
metrical result would hold for the marriage problem (i.e., each college can accept only one
student) when the role of students and colleges are exchanged. However, as Suh and Wen
noted and as our example shows that their argument does not hold without further restric-
tions imposed on a preference domain. Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) and Sotomayor
(2003) show that the core correspondence and/or the set of stable solutions of the college
admissions are implementable in the SPE when collegespreferences are substitutable.5 All
the mechanisms considered are two stage mechanisms such that agents on one side propose
or choose a set of potential partners simultaneously in the rst stage and agents on the other
side choose whom to be matched simultaneously in the second stage. In the mechanism
employed by Sotomayor (2003), agents of one side who move in the rst stage choose a
set of acceptable partners. However, in Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000), the choice set
of each agent who move in the rst stage is restricted to be a singleton set. Because the
mechanisms considered are di¤erent from the SM-mechanism in the sense that agents who
are active, (i.e. agents who move in the rst stage) do not decide sequentially, our results
cannot be seen as a consequence of those obtained by Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000)
4In college admissions problems, when colleges have preferences over sets of students rather than individ-
ual students, a stable solution may not exist unless collegespreferences satisfy substitutability. Colleges
preferences satisfy substitutability if and only if for any two students s 6= s0 and for any subset of students
A with s; s0 2 A, if s is in Chc (A), then s is also in Chc (An fs0g) where Chc (A) is dened as the most
prefered set of students by c among all subsets of A (including A).
5It is known that for a college admissions problem, the core of a college admissions problem coincides
with the set of pairwise stable solutions under subsitutable preferences (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
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and Sotomayor (2003).
Some other important studies that are interested in the implementation of stable
solutions or the core of the problem are Alcalde (1996), Shin and Suh (1996), and Kara and
Sonmez (1996). Alcalde (1996) has employed and compared two mechanisms one of which
is the Gale-Shapley algorithm to analyze the possibility of implementing stable outcomes
for marriage markets. Shin and Suh (1996) have considered a stable matching mechanism
that implements the stable rule that selects all of the stable matchings in a strong Nash
equilibrium. Kara and Sonmez (1996) have shown that all rules by which Pareto optimal
and individually rational matchings are implementable as supersolutions of the stable rule.
This work is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the marriage model
and some useful denitions and preliminary results. We present the Eeckhout and M con-
ditions, and present the results of Eeckhout (2000) and Suh and Wen (2008) that are used
and analyzed throughout the paper. In section 3, we introduce our ring condition. First, we
introduce the NRMO condition and show the equivalency of the NRMO and M conditions.
Second, we present our results regarding the NRS condition. In section 4, we focus on the
SM-mechanism, and give some preliminary results. In Section 5, we rst prove that the
NRMO condition is the necessary and su¢ cient condition to implement M in the SPE of
the men-move-rst mechanism regardless how individuals move. Next, we prove that the
NRS condition is necessary and su¢ cient to have a unique stable matching and to have the
unique stable matching as the SPE outcome of the Suh-Wen sequential matching game no
matter how individuals move. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
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The Model
The one-to-one matching problem that we consider is interpreted as a marriage
problem. In a marriage problem, there are two disjoint nite sets of individuals, men and
women, denoted by M and W . Each individual has preferences over the individuals of the
opposite sex and being unmatched. A matching is a function  :M [W  !M [W such
that each man is matched at most one woman or remains unmatched, and each woman is
matched to at most one man or remains unmatched. Individual i is unmatched, we write
 (i) = i.
We assume that there are equal number of men and women, jM j = jW j = n.
Individualspreferences are complete, irreexive, transitive, and strict. Let i represents
individual is preferences. Individual j is acceptable to i if i prefers to be matched to j rather
than being unmatched, j i i. Given a preference prole = (i)i2M[W , a matching  is
individually rational if  (i) is acceptable to i for all i 2M [W . A pair of man and woman
(m;w) blocks  if w m  (m) and m w  (w). A matching  is stable if it is individually
rational and if there is no blocking pair for . A stable matching M is the men-optimal
stable matching if every man likes M as much as any other stable matching. The existence
of optimal stable matchings is due to Gale and Shapley (1962).
Preliminary Results
In this section, we present some preliminary results that we benet throughout the
paper. The rst of these results is related to the condition considered by Eeckhout (2000).
Eeckhout Condition. It is possible to rename the individuals such that (i) for all mi 2 M ,
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wi mi wj for all j > i and (ii) for all wi 2W , mi wi mj for all j > i.
Eeckhout (2000) shows that the Eeckhout condition is a su¢ cient condition for
there to be a unique stable matching. The following example shows that the Eeckhout
condition is not necessary.
Example 1 The preference prole  is given by:
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w1 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w2 w3 m1 m3 m1
w2 w3 w1 m2 m1 m2
The unique stable matching for  is
 =

m1 m2 m3
w1 w2 w3

:
The prole does not satisfy the Eeckhout Condition because there is no pair of man and
woman who mutually rank each other rst.
Eeckhout (2000) also shows that a preference prole that satises the Eeckhout
condition contains no ring of a certain order. An ordered set of men and women is a (strict)
ring if they can be arranged in a circle with men-women couples alternating such that each
individual prefers the next person in the circle (e.g., clockwise) to the one who precedes
him or her. The formal denition of a ring is as follows.
Denition 1 A ring is an ordered list of men and women (x1; x2; : : : ; xk), (k  3), such
that xi+1 xi xi 1, 8i = 1; : : : ; k (mod k).
Observe that there must be at least two men and two women in a ring (in a
marriage problem), and each individual in the ring must be the opposite sex of the preceding
and succeeding individuals.
Lemma 1 (Eeckhout, 2000, Lemma 2) A preference prole  that satises the Eeck-
hout condition contains no ring of type (rk; sk; rl; sl; : : : ; rp; sp), (k  2), where ri 2 M for
all i = k; : : : ; p, if and only if si 2W for all i = k; : : : ; p such that k < l <    < p.
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We should highlight two points about this lemma. First, the lemma does not say
that when the Eeckhout condition is satised, a preference prole does not contain a ring.
The rings that are considered here are a certain type of rings. Second, the converse of the
lemma is not true. For example, the prole considered in 1 does not contain any such ring,
but it does not satisfy the Eeckhout condition.
Another condition that we consider in this paper is the M condition that is
introduced by Suh and Wen (2008). They identify M with the M condition.
The M Condition. A preference prole  satises the M condition if it is possible to
rename the individuals such that (i) for all mi 2 M , wi mi wj for all j > i and (ii)
for all mi 2M , if wj mi wi for all j < i, then mj wj mi.
Proposition 1 (Suh and Wen, 2008, Proposition 2) Under the M condition, the men-
optimal stable matching is , where  (mi) = wi for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
The Ring Conditions
The NRMO and M conditions
In this section, we identify a ring condition, which we call the No-ring-by-which-
men-swap-optimal-partners (NRMO) condition. We analyze the M condition, which Suh
and Wen (2008) introduce, and its relation to the NRMO condition. We show that the
NRMO and M conditions are equivalent. Now, the denition of the NRMO condition is
introduced.
The NRMO condition. A preference prole  satises the NRMO condition if and only if
there is no ring (wk;mk; : : : ; wt;mt), such that M (wi) = mi for all i = k; : : : ; t.
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Observe that if a preference prole satisfy the M condition, then it is possible
to order the individuals such that for any man, all women with higher indices are less
preferred than the woman who has the same index as the man. Such an ordering would
not be possible is there is a ring of type (wk;mk; : : : ; wt;mt), such that M (wi) = mi for
all i = k; : : : ; t because eventually there is at least one man who prefers a woman with a
higher index to the woman with the same index due to the nature of a ring.
Lemma 2 If a preference prole  satises the NRMO condition, then there is at least one
man who is matched to his top choice in M .
Proposition 2 A preference prole  satises the M condition if and only if it satises
the NRMO condition.
The Eeckhout and NRS conditions
In this section we focus on the Eeckhout condition. We introduce the No-ring-
by-which-stable-matching-partners-are-swapped (NRS) condition, and show that the NRS
condition is weaker then the Eeckhout condition, yet it is su¢ cient for there to be a unique
stable matching. The NRS condition focuses on rings in which each man in the ring and
the woman who precedes him or each woman in the ring and the man who precedes him
are stable matching partners. The condition requires the nonexistence of such rings.
NRS Condition. A preference prole  satises the NRS condition if and only if there is
no ring (r1; s1; : : : ; rk; sk) such that  (ri) = si where  is a stable matching ri 2M if
and only if si 2W for all i = k; : : : ; t .
The preference prole in Example 1 satises the NRS condition. This is because
for any individual ri 2M [W , if  (rj) ri  (ri), then we have  (rj) rj  (ri). Hence, a
ring which contains a group of individuals and their partners in a stable matching cannot be
formed. The following example shows a preference prole which violates the NRS condition.
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Example 2 The following preference prole violates the NRS condition.
 1
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w3 w3 w2 m2 m1 m3
w1 w2 w3 m1 m2 m1
w2 w1 w1 m3 m3 m2
The two stable matchings are
M =

m1 m2 m3
w1 w2 w3

and W =

m1 m2 m3
w2 w3 w1

.
A ring by which the NRS condition is violated is (w2;m2; w3;m3).
Notice that the NRS condition focuses on rings that make it possible for a group
of the same sex individuals to be better o¤ by swapping their stable matching partners in
the sequential matching mechanism. That is, the NRS condition suggests that rings by
which a group of same sex individuals swap their stable matching partners are relevant to
the uniqueness and implementation of stable matchings and all other rings are irrelevant.
Observe that the Eeckhout condition is stronger than the NRS condition. This is because if
there is a ring by which the NRS condition is violated, then for any ordering of individuals,
we always have rj ri si with j > i, for some individuals rj ; ri; si. Hence, whenever the NRS
condition is violated, the Eeckhout condition is also violated. Furthermore, if we let the
stable matching in the denition of the NRS condition be M and si = mi, the denition
becomes the denition of the NRMO condition. Hence, the NRS condition implies the
NRMO condition. Next, we show that the NRS condition is a su¢ cient condition for there
to be a unique stable matching in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If a preference prole  satises the NRS condition, then there is a unique
stable matching for .
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A sequential Matching Mechanism
The sequential matching mechanism (SM-mechanism) considered in this paper is
a 2n stage extensive form game of perfect information. The order of moves is given by
a surjective function  : f1; : : : ; 2ng  ! M [W , where  (k) denotes the individual who
moves in the kth stage of the mechanism.
In stage 1,  (1) either proposes to a potential mate or chooses to be single.
In stage k, 1 < k < 2n, after observing the history of the game up to stage k,  (k)
either (i) accepts one potential mate who has proposed to him or her in a previous stage,
(ii) proposes to a potential mate who will move in a subsequent stage, or (iii) chooses to
remain single.
In stage 2n,  (2n) either accepts one potential mate who has proposed to him or
her in a previous stage, or chooses to remain single.
There is a di¤erent sequential mechanism for every order of moves. A mechanism
in which all men move before women is called a men-move-rst mechanism. A women-
move-rst mechanism is dened similarly.
Given an order of moves, the outcome of this mechanism is a matching. This is
because an individual cannot accept more than one proposal, and by making a proposal or by
deciding to remain single, he or she must reject all proposals that has been received. Because
preferences are strict, the SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism for a given an order of moves
is unique. Moreover, the SPE outcome of the game is an individually rational matching.
This is because an individual i would choose to remain single rather than proposing to or
accepting a proposal from someone who is not acceptable for i.
Suh and Wen (2008) show that the Eeckhout condition is also a su¢ cient condition
to implement the unique stable matching as the SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism for any
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order of moves. They also show that the M condition is a su¢ cient condition to implement
M in the SPE of the men-move-rst sequential matching mechanism regardless of which
order the individuals move in.
Proposition 4 (Suh and Wen, 2008, Theorem 3) Under the M condition, the SPE
outcome of the men-move-rst mechanism is the men-optimal stable matching M .
The men-optimal and the unique stable matchings in the equilibrium
The men-optimal stable matching in the equilibrium
In this section, we investigate the men-move-rst mechanism. In particular, we
focus on the conditions under which M is the SPE outcome of the men-move-rst mecha-
nism. Our main purpose is to show that the NRMO condition is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for M to be the SPE outcome of the men-move-rst mechanism for any order of
moves. By Propositions 2 and 4, we already know that the NRMO condition is a su¢ cient
condition for M to be the SPE of any men-move-rst mechanism. Hence, we only need to
prove that the NRMO condition is also necessary for M to be the SPE of any men-move-
rst mechanism. The next proposition is used to prove the necessity and su¢ ciency of the
NRMO condition.
Proposition 5 There is no men-move-rst mechanism such that a man is matched to a
woman worse than his M partner in the SPE.
Proposition 6 A preference prole  satises the NRMO condition if and only if the SPE
outcome of the men-move-rst mechanism is M regardless the order of moves.
We nish this section by the following corollary and Figure 1 which summarizes
our results of this section.
Corollary 1 Given a preference prole , the SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism for any
order of moves is M if and only if  satises the NRMO condition if and only if  satises
the M condition.
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Figure 1. The NRMO and M Conditions
The unique stable matching in the equilibrium
In this section, we are interested in identifying a necessary and su¢ cient condition
to guarantee the stability of the SPE outcome of any sequential mechanism. We show that
the NRS condition serves the purpose of this section. First, we prove that if a preference
prole satises the NRS condition, not only there is a unique stable matching, but this
matching is also the unique SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism for any order of moves. We
present two lemmas that are used throughout the paper. Before we present these lemmas,
we need to introduce new notation and denitions that are useful. A preference prole  and
a SM-mechanism is given. Set P tk ( (i)), i = 1; 2; : : : ; 2n, is dened as the set of individuals
who have proposed to individual  (i) between the beginning of stage k until the beginning
of stage t and set T k ( (k)) is dened as f (l) 2 M [W : l > k;  1 ( ( (l))) < k, and
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 (k) (l) u, for all u 2 P k1 ( (l))g. A strategy prole s = (s1; : : : ; s2n), where sj denotes
the strategy for an individual j, and stable matching  pair, (s; ), is dened as follows:
s(1) = ( (1))
...
s(k) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
accept v if v (k) w, for all w 2 P k1 ( (k)) [ T k ( (k))
propose v if v (k) w, for all w 2 P k1 ( (k)) [ T k ( (k))
stay single otherwise
...
s2n =
8>><>>:
accept v if v 2 P 2n1 ( (2n)) and v (2n) w, for all w 2 P 2n1 ( (2n))
stay single otherwise
Before we comment on s, let us explain set T k ( (k)). Each individual  (l)
in T k ( (k)) moves after  (k),  ( (l)) moves before  (k), and  (l) has not received
a proposal from someone whom  (l) prefers to  (k) until stage k. If s is played, the
individual who moves in stage 1,  (1), can only propose to his or her  partner. In stage
k, 1 < k < 2n, the individual who moves in stage k,  (k), can either accept individual
vs proposal or propose to individual v, if v is the most preferred individual among those
who have proposed to  (k) and among those whose  partners have moved before v and
who like  (k) as much as anyone who has proposed them until stage k. Otherwise,  (k)
stays single. The individual who moves in the last stage,  (2n), can either accept the best
proposal in hand or stays single. Now we present the lemmas.
Lemma 3 Given a preference prole  and a SM-mechanism, if each individual i plays
si in this mechanism, the matching induced by s
 is the stable matching is , for any pair
(s; ).
Lemma 4 Given a preference prole  and a SM-mechanism, for any pair (s; ), s is the
SPE strategy, if  does not contain a ring as (ri;  (ri) ; ri+1;  (ri+1) ; : : : ; rk;  (rk)) where
ri+1 = 
0 ( (ri)) for some matching 0 6= .
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Figure 2. The Eeckhout and NRS Conditions
Proposition 7 If a preference prole  satises the NRS condition, the SPE outcome of
the SM-mechanism is a stable matching for any order of moves.
So far, only the su¢ ciency of the NRS condition has been considered. Our next
step is to show that when there is a unique stable matching for a preference prole, the
NRS condition is also a necessary condition to implement this stable matching as the SPE
outcome of the sequential matching game regardless of how individuals move.
Proposition 8 For a preference prole , if there is a unique stable matching  and  is
the SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism for any order of moves, then the preference prole
 satises the NRS condition.
Figure 2 summarizes the results that are considered this section.
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Conclusion
One may suppose that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential
matching mechanism considered in this paper is a stable matching regardless of the order
of individuals. However, as we show in our rst example, the stability of the equilibrium
outcome is not guaranteed under unrestricted preference domain assumption. Motivated
by this fact, we search for "ring" conditions that a preference prole should satisfy to
implement stable matchings. The reason for our interest in ring conditions is the relation
between rings (or cycles) in a prole and stable allocations, which has gained considerable
attention in many di¤erent contexts in the literature. We also investigate the conditions
previously considered for implementation of stable matchings, and explain these conditions
in terms of rings.
In this paper, we answer two questions: 1) Under which "ring" conditions are M ,
W , and the unique stable matching implementable in the SPE of the SM-mechanism re-
gardless of which order the individuals move in, and 2) how are the ring conditions related
to other conditions such as the Eeckhout condition (Eeckhout, 2000) and the alpha condi-
tions (Suh and Wen, 2008) that are previously considered in the context of implementing
M ,W , and the unique stable matching?
We introduce the NRS and NRMO conditions to answer the rst question. The
NRS condition is used to guarantee the existence of a unique stable matching and to im-
plement the unique stable matching. That is, we prove that the NRS condition is both
necessary and su¢ cient for there to be a unique stable matching and for this matching to
be implementable in the SPE independent of the order of individualsmoves. The NRMO
condition is introduced to implement M and is shown that it is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for M to be the SPE outcome of the men-move-rst mechanism.
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In order to answer the second question, we rst show that the NRMO condition
is an equivalent ring condition of the M . Second, we show that the NRS condition is a
weaker condition for both the existence and implementation of the unique stable matching.
As a future research project, we plan to propose a more general ring condition to
implement all stable matchings in the SPE. Our conjecture for such a ring condition is the
following: If a preference prole does not contain a ring such that an unstable matching
can be obtained from a stable matching  through this ring when a group of same sex
individuals switch their partners in , then the SPE outcome of the sequential mechanism
is a stable matching no matter which order individuals move in. A future research topic
may be to show that such a ring condition is a necessary and su¢ cient condition to have a
stable matching in the SPE.
Another question that we want to ask is the following: Is there any the relation
between the order of individual and the equilibrium outcome? In particular, we want to
focus on the order of moves of individuals and search for a certain rule to order individuals
to implement specic stable matchings.
Appendix.
Lemma 2. If a preference prole  satises the NRMO condition, then there is at least
one man who is matched to his top choice in M .
Proof. On the contrary, suppose that no man is matched to his top choice in M .
We show that  does not satisfy the NRMO condition.
Take an arbitrary man and rename him as m1. Note that w m1 M (m1) = w1
for some w 2W by assumption. Let w2 be m1s top ranked woman and let M (m2) = w2.
By assumption, w m2 w2 for some w 2 W . If m2s top ranked woman is w1, we have a
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ring (w1;m1; w2;m2) and  does not satisfy the NRMO condition. Otherwise, let m2s top
ranked woman be w3 and let M (m3) = w3. By assumption, w m3 w3 for some w 2W . If
m3s top listed woman is in fw1; w2g. Then, we have a ring of type (w1;m1; w2;m2; w3;m3)
if m3s top listed woman is w1 or (w2;m2; w3;m3) if m3s top listed woman is w2. The
NRMO condition is violated in either case. In an arbitrary step k of this process, we either
have a ring by which the condition is violated or mks top ranked woman wk+1 is not in
fw1; : : : ; wkg. Because there is a nite number of individuals, the process must eventually
terminate a ring. Hence, the NRMO condition is violated.
Proposition 2. A preference prole  satises the M condition if and only if it satises
the NRMO condition.
Proof. First we prove the su¢ ciency of the NRMO condition. Suppose that 
satises the NRMO condition. By lemma 2, there is at least one man who is matched to his
top choice in M . Rename all men who are matched to their top choices in M arbitrarily
as m1; : : : ;mk, 1  k  n, and let M1 = fm1; : : : ;mkg. Moreover, rename all women in
M (M1) such that M (mi) = wi for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg.
Obtain a reduced preference prole 1 by eliminating all individuals in M1 [
M (M1) from the original prole . Observe that 1satises the NRMO condition because
if 1does not satisfy the NRMO condition due to a ring, then  violates the NRMO
condition by the same ring. By lemma 2, there is at least one man who is matched to
his top choice in M for 1. Rename all men who are matched to their top choices in
M in the reduced prole 1 arbitrarily as mk+1; : : : ;mm, k + 1  m  n. Let M2 =
fmk; : : : ;mmg. Also rename all women in M (M2) such that M (mi) = wi for all i 2
fk + 1; : : : ;mg, and obtain a reduced preference prole 2 by eliminating all individuals inS2
i=1
 
Mi [ M (M2)

. The process eventually stops after step t when all individuals are
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renumbered and eliminated from t. After individuals are renumbered, we have wi mi w
for all w 2Wn fwig, for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg. Moreover, any reduced prole k coincides with
 in terms of preference ordering of all individuals in (M [W ) nSki=1  Mi [ M (Mi),
k = 1; : : : ; t. Thus, for all mi 2M , we have wi mi wj , for all j > i. Furthermore, if there
is a woman wj such that wj mi wi for some j < i, then mj wj mi by the stability of M ,
for all mi 2M . Thus,  satises the M condition.
Now, we prove the necessity of the NRMO condition. Suppose that  satises
the M condition. By Proposition 1, wi = M (mi) for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Now, assume
to the contrary that  does not satisfy the NRMO condition. Consider an arbitrary ring
(wa;ma; wb;mb; : : : ; wk;mk) and wi = M (mi) for all i 2 fa; : : : ; kg. By the M condition,
a < k because wa mk wk. By similar logic, we have k <    < b < a; this contradicts
a < k.
Proposition 3. If a preference prole  satises the NRS condition, then there is a unique
stable matching for .
Proof. Suppose that there are multiple stable matchings for the preference prole
. So, the men and women optimal matchings, M and W , are distinct. Let M 0 M be
the set of all men such that M (m) 6= W (m) for all m 2M 0. By optimality, M (m) m
W (m) for all m 2M 0. That is, for any m 2M 0, we have W (m) = M (m0) for some m0 2
Mn fmg with  (m0) 6= 0 (m) for any m 6= m. Because M 0 is nite, there exists a group
of men fmi; : : : ;mkg 2M 0 who form a ring
 
M (mi) ;mi; 
M (mj) ;mj ; : : : ; 
M (mk) ;mk

.
Proposition 5. There is no men-move-rst mechanism such that a man is matched to a
woman worse than his M partner in the SPE.
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a men-move-rst mechanism
such that a man is matched to a woman worse than his men-optimal partner in the SPE
outcome of this mechanism. Let the SPE outcome be a matching  6= M . Consider the rst
man who is matched to a woman worse than his men-optimal partner in this mechanism.
Let this man be m1 and M (m1) be w1. When its m1s turn to move, the reason for m1s
not proposing to w1 is that w1 rejects m1 in favor of a man whom she likes more than m1
if m1 proposes to w1. Consider the subgame starting with m1s proposal to w1. By the
stability of M , the man who proposes to w1 in the subgame where m1 proposes to w1 likes
his M partner more than w1. Hence, in the subgame where m1 proposes to w1, there is
at least one man who proposes to a woman worse than his M partner according to his
equilibrium strategy, and this man moves after m1, by assumption. Let the rst man who
proposes to a woman worse than his M partner according to his equilibrium strategy in
the subgame where m1 proposes to w1 be m2. Let  (m2) be w2. Note that m2 is the rst
man who proposes to a woman worse than w2 and is not necessarily the man who proposes
to w1. Hence, every man who moves after m1 and before m2 has either proposed to his M
partner or a more preferred woman according to his equilibrium strategy in the subgame
where m1 proposes to w1. Thus, when it is m2s turn to move, if w2 has already a proposal
from another man, it must be from a man to whom w2 prefers m2. Consider the subgame
starting with m2s proposal. Similarly, in this subgame, when it is m2s turn to move, the
reason for m2s not proposing to w2 is that if he does so, w2 rejects m2 in favor of another
man, whom she likes more than m2. By the stability of M , the man who proposes to w2
likes his M partner better than w2. Hence, there exists at least one man who proposes to a
woman worse than his mate under M according to his equilibrium strategy in the subgame
where m1 proposes w1 and m2 proposes to w2. In any step j of this process, we pick the
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rst man who proposes to a woman worse than his M partner, and rename him as mj .
Then mj proposes to M (mj) = wj instead of proposing to a woman worse than wk.
Consider an arbitrary step k of the process which starts with mks proposal. Ob-
serve that wk has not received a proposal from a man whom she prefers to mk. If wk has
already an o¤er in her hand, then it must be from a man to whom she prefers mk.
Because there are nite number of men, this process must eventually end in a step,
say t, in which mt proposes to M (mt) = wt, and there is no other man who moves after
mt and proposes to a woman worse than his M partner. On the other hand, we know that
mt is the rst man who would propose to a woman worse than M (mt) = wt after step t 1
according to his equilibrium strategy. Hence, it must be the case that if he mt proposes to
wt, he will be rejected in favor of another man, contradiction.
Proposition 6. A preference prole  satises the NRMO condition if and only if the SPE
outcome of the men-move-rst mechanism is M regardless the order of moves.
Proof. By Proposition 4, the M condition is a su¢ cient condition for M to
be the SPE outcome. By Proposition 2, the NRMO condition is also a su¢ cient condition
for M to be the SPE outcome. Hence, we only need to show the necessity of the NRMO
condition.
Suppose that  does not satisfy the NRMO condition. Hence,  contains a ring
(wk;mk; : : : ; wt;mt) such that M (wi) = mi 8i = k; : : : ; t. We show that there is an order
of moves such that SPE outcome of the mechanism is not M .
Let (w1;m1; : : : ; wt;mt) be a ring such that M (wi) = mi 8i = 1; : : : ; t. If there is
more than one ring of the same type, consider the ring (wk;mk; : : : ; wt;mt) with wi+1 mi w
for all w 2 fwk; : : : ; wtg, for every man mi in fmk; : : : ;mtg. Such a ring exists because if
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wj mi wi+1 for some wj 2 fwk; : : : ; wtg, then we can obtain another ring of the same type
by eliminating individuals wi+1;mi+1; : : : ; wj 1;mj 1 from the original ring.
Let M1 = fm1; : : : ;mtg be the set of all men in the ring. Suppose that all men
in MnM1 move before all men in M1 and each man mi in M1 is followed by mi+1, i =
1; : : : ; t; (mod t). In the rst case that we need to consider, there exists a man m0 2MnM1
who proposes to a woman w00 6= M (m). So, the SPE outcome is not M , and the proof is
done.
In the second case that we need to consider, each man in MnM1 proposes to his
M partner. We claim that that each man m in M1 proposes to a woman in M (M1).
This is because if a man m in M1 proposes to a woman w0 in WnM (M1), w0 refuses
m in favor of M (w0) because M (w0) w0 m by the stability of M . Hence, each man
m in M1 proposes to a woman in M (M1). Suppose that each man mi in M1 proposes
to wi+1; i = 1; : : : ; k; (mod k). We claim that no man can do better by proposing to another
woman. Because wi+1 mi w for all w 2 M (M1), mi cannot do better by proposing
to another woman if wi+1 accepts mis proposal. Moreover, because the only proposal in
wi+1s hand is from mi, wi+1 accepts mis o¤er. Hence, mi cannot do better by proposing
to another woman. So, the SPE outcome is not M . The proof is complete.
Lemma 3. Given a preference prole  and a SM-mechanism, if each individual i plays si
in this mechanism, the matching induced by s is the stable matching is , for any
pair (s; ).
Proof. We use an induction proof. Suppose that each individual plays si . We
show that each individual i is matched with  (i), i.e., proposes to  (i) and is accepted or
accepts  (i)s proposal when i plays si . Individual  (1) proposes to ( (1)) according to
s(1). Assume that in stage k,  (k) plays s

(k) and is matched with ( (k)). Consider step
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k + 1. We know that  (k + 1) has not received a proposal from an individual  (j) with
j < k and  (j) 6= ( (k)), because every  (j) with j < k and  (j) 6= ( (k)) is matched
with  ( (j)). Now, we consider all potential partners who move in subsequent stages.
According to s(k+1), if  (k + 1) prefers ( (k + 1)) more than all potential partners who
move in subsequent stages, then  (k + 1) should be matched with ( (k + 1)). Consider
an arbitrary individual  (l) such that  (l) (k+1)  ( (k + 1)) and l > k. For  (l) to be
a potential partner of  (k + 1),  (l) must be in T k+1 ( (k + 1)). That is,  ( (l)) must
move before  (k + 1) and  (k + 1) (l) u for all u 2 P k1 ( (l)). By our initial assumption,
 ( (l)) must have already proposed to  (l), hence,  (k + 1) 6(l) u for all u 2 P k1 ( (l)).
Because  (l) is chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that T k+1 ( (k + 1)) n f ( (k + 1))g is
empty. That is,  (k + 1) should be matched with ( (k + 1)) if he or she play s(k+1).
Lemma 4. Given a preference prole  and a SM-mechanism, for any pair (s; ), s is the
SPE strategy, if  does not contain a ring as (ri;  (ri) ; ri+1;  (ri+1) ; : : : ; rk;  (rk))
where ri+1 = 0 ( (ri)) for some matching 0 6= .
Proof. Given a preference prole  and a SM-mechanism, we know that the
matching induced by s is the stable matching  by lemma 3. We show that if s is
not the SPE strategy, then there is a ring (ri;  (ri) ; ri+1;  (ri+1) ; : : : ; rk;  (rk)) where
ri+1 = 
0 ( (ri)) for some matching 0 6= . Suppose that s is not the SPE strategy.
Hence, there exists a subgame in which when an individual v 2 M [W is the rst one to
move, v deviates from sv and can be matched to an individual ranked higher than  (v)
in vs preference list when all i 2 M [ Wn fvg plays si . Given the order of moves of
individuals, assume without loss of generality that m1 is the person who deviates from s
and let the matching outcome when m1 deviates be 0. Let  (m1) = w1 and 0 (m1) = w2.
Because each individual i who moves before m1, plays si , each individual i who moves
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before m1 proposes to or accepts an o¤er from  (i) by lemma 3. Hence, w2 cannot be
one of those individual who move before m1 because otherwise she would have proposed
to m2. That is, w2 moves after m1. Because w2 is matched to m1, it must be the case
that the best that w2 can do according to sw2 is to accept m1s o¤er. Hence, m1 must
be the best man among those in P 
 1(w2)
1 (w2) [ T 
 1(w2) (w2). This is possible only if
 (w2) = m2 has moved before w2 and has not proposed to w2. Hence, there is a women in
P 
 1(m2)
1 (m2)[T 
 1(m2) (m2), say w3, such that w3 m2 w2, and m2 must be the best man
among those in P 
 1(w3)
1 (w3) [ T 
 1(w2) (w3). If w3 = w1, this procedure terminates in this
step and we have a ring (w1;m1; w2;m2) with w2 = 0 (m1) and w1 = 0 (m2), hence, the
proof is done. If w3 6= w1, there is a women in P  1(m3)1 (m3) [ T 
 1(m3) (m3), say w4, such
that w4 m3 w3. andm3 must be the best man among those in P 
 1(w4)
1 (w4)[T 
 1(w4) (w4).
If w4 2 fw1; w2g, the procedure terminates in this step, and we have a ring which is
(w1;m1; w2;m2; w3;m3) with w2 = 0 (m1), w3 = 0 (m2), and w1 = 0 (m3) if w4 = w1, or
(w2;m2; w3;m3) with w3 = 0 (m2), and w2 = 0 (m3) if w4 = w2. In either case, the proof
is done.
This procedure must either terminate in some step where wk is considered or there
exists a woman wj+1 with wj+1 = 0 (mj). If the procedure terminates, we obtain a ring
(wi;  (wi) ; : : : ; wk;  (wk)) with wj+1 = 0 ( (wj)) for all j = i; : : : k,(mod j). By the fact
that there are nite number of individuals, the procedure must eventually terminate and we
obtain a ring (wi;  (wi) ; : : : ; wk;  (wk)) with wj+1 = 0 ( (wj)) for all j = i; : : : k,(mod j).
Hence, the proof is done.
Proposition 7. If a preference prole  satises the NRS condition, the SPE outcome of
the SM-mechanism for any order of moves is a stable matching.
Proof. Suppose that  satises the NRS condition. By Proposition 3, we know
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that there exists a unique stable matching . By lemma 4, strategy s is the SPE strategy
for this mechanism given the pair (s; ). By lemma 3, this SPE outcome is . Because the
SPE outcome of any SM-mechanism is unique, we conclude that the unique stable matching
 for  is the SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism.
Proposition 8. For a preference prole , if there is a unique stable matching  and  is
the SPE outcome of the SM-mechanism for any order of moves, then the preference
prole  satises the NRS condition.
Proof. Suppose that the preference prole  does not satisfy the NRS condition.
If there are multiple stable matchings, then the proof is complete.
Suppose that there is a unique stable matching . Hence,  = M = W . Because
 does not satisfy the NRS condition, there exists a ring of type (wl;ml; : : : ; wt;mt) or
(ml; wl; : : : ;mt; wt), and  (mi) = wi where  is the unique stable matching. Without loss
of generality, suppose that the ring is of type (wl;ml; wm;mm; : : : ; wt;mt). Hence,  does
not satisfy the NRMO condition. By Proposition 6, we know that there exists an order of
moves in the men-move-rst mechanism such that the SPE outcome is matching 0 such
that 0 M 0  for a nonempty subset of men M 0. Hence, the proof is complete.
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CHAPTER III
A SOLUTION FOR THE ROOMMATE PROBLEM AND A SEQUENTIAL
MATCHING MECHANISM
Introduction
In a roommate problem, there is a set of individuals and each individual has a
preference over all other individuals, including oneself. A roommate problem is the problem
of identifying pairs (i.e., individuals who share a room) and singletons (i.e., individuals who
stay alone). The outcome is referred as a matching. A matching is individually rational
if there is no individual who would stay alone rather than sharing a room with his mate
in the matching. Two individuals block the matching if they prefer sharing a room with
each other rather than sharing the room with their current mates in the matching. A
matching is (pairwise) stable if it is individually rational and it is not blocked by a pair.
A roommate problem may not have a stable solution. A roommate problem has a solution
or is solvable if there is a stable matching, unsolvable otherwise. Tan (1991) shows that a
roommate problem has a stable matching if and only if there is a stable partition without
an odd ring. A stable partition is a partition of the set of individuals such that each set in a
stable partition is either a ring, or a pair of mutually acceptable individuals, or a singleton,
and the partition satises stability between sets and also within each set. A ring is an
ordered subset of individuals such that each individual prefers the subsequent individual to
the preceding individual. A ring is an odd (even) ring if there is an odd (even) number of
people in the ring.
Inarra et al (2008) introduce P   stability as a solution concept such that the
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existence of a P   stable matching is guaranteed. The P   stability concept is based on
Tans (1991) stable partitions. For a stable partition P , a P   stable matching is one that
matches each individual to his subsequent or preceding individual in any set of the stable
partition P , and one individual is unmatched (i.e., stays alone) if the set is an odd ring or
singleton.
The paper has two parts: In the rst part, we focus on a solution concept for
the roommate problem, and in the second part we study a sequential matching mechanism
for the roommate problem and analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this
mechanism. In the rst part, we propose a solution concept, which is called RP   stability
(reduced preference prole P stability). We introduce a procedure, which is called the RP
procedure, and we dene an RP stablematching as the outcome of the RP procedure. Our
motivation for introducing the RP   stability is that the number of matched individuals
in any RP   stable matching is always greater than or equal to the number of those in
any P   stable matching. Moreover, whenever a Pareto improvement is possible based
on a P   stable matching, there is an RP   stable matching which Pareto dominates the
corresponding P   stable matching.
The RP procedure starts with a stable partition1 in a roommate problem. A
reduced preference prole is obtained by cutting an odd ring in the stable partition, i.e., by
eliminating each individual in an arbitrary pair of succeeding and preceding individuals in
the odd ring from each others preference list. A stable partition with respect to a reduced
prole is called a reduced stable partition. Once an odd ring is cut and a reduced prole
is obtained, the procedure continues cutting one odd ring in each reduced prole stable
partition until a prole for which there is no stable partition with an odd ring is reached.
1The procedure chooses odd rings according to a protocol which is explained in details when the protocol
is presented.
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Such a reduced prole is called a nal reduced prole. A stable partition with respect to a
nal reduced prole is a nal stable partition. When a nal reduced prole is reached, the
procedure considers the most recent step where there is an odd ring in which there are still
some individuals who have not been used to cut the odd ring, and the procedure continues
by cutting that odd ring. The procedure eventually stops when there is no such step to
consider. An RP   stable matching is a P   stable matching with respect to a nal stable
partition that is obtained through the procedure.
Given a prole, when there is a stable partition with an odd ring, there is always an
individual i in the odd ring who is not matched to one of his neighbors (the succeeding and
the preceding individuals) in any matching. The RP procedure cuts odd rings to capture
the idea that an individual cannot be matched to either of his neighbors in an odd ring.
In all P   stable matchings in which individual i is not matched to one of his neighbors in
the odd ring, i would be unmatched. But, individual i should not be unmatched if there
is another individual j such that both i and j prefer being matched to each other rather
than being unmatched. In such a situation, i and j would be matched in an RP   stable
matching and observe that matching i and j would be a Pareto improvement, and the
number of matches is greater when i and j are matched.
Obviously, if there is no partition with an odd ring, then the set of RP   stable
matchings is equal to the set of P   stable matchings. Hence, when the roommate problem
is solvable, RP   stability and P   stability are equivalent. Moreover, because the set
of P   stable matchings and the set of stable matchings are equivalent when the problem
is solvable (Inarra et al 2008), RP   stability and stability are also equivalent concepts
for solvable roommate problems. However, P   stability and RP   stability concepts are
unrelated, i.e., neither of them implies the other, for unsolvable roommate problems.
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We focus on a roommate problem when individuals move sequentially according
to a previously specied order in the second part of the paper. In the mechanism, an
individual can choose one of the three possible actions when it is his turn to move: (i)
Accept an o¤er from another individual who has proposed to him at a previous stage, or
(ii) propose to a potential individual who moves at a later stage, or (iii) choose to remain
single. We are interested in analyzing the subgame perfect equilibrium the (SPE) outcome
of the sequential matching mechanism2.
In the second part, our rst objective is to show that the RP procedure can be
used to identify the set of all potential SPE outcomes. Our second objective is to identify
a su¢ cient condition which guarantees the stability of the SPE outcome regardless of the
order of individuals.
Odd rings play an important role in the sequential game as they do for the existence
of stable matchings in roommate problems. Because of an odd ring, an individual may not
be matched to either of his neighbors. The same individual may not be matched to his best
alternative after his neighbors just because i and his next best alternative, too, are in an
odd ring. Obviously, an odd ring, which contains i and his next best alternative, would
only appear in a reduced stable partition, but not appear in the original stable partition.
Because the RP procedure captures such odd rings, too, by considering the reduced proles,
it is able to identify all potential SPE outcomes. By analyzing the relation between the SPE
and RP   stability, we are able to identify a su¢ cient condition to guarantee the stability
of the SPE outcome regardless of the order of moves in solvable roommate problems.
The roommate problem was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). They show
that a stable matching may not exist in a roommate problem, but there is a stable matching
2Hereafter, when we say the SPE outcome, we mean the SPE outcome of the sequential mechanism.
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for every marriage problem, which is a special case of the roommate problem. There are
many studies that investigate stable matchings in both roommate and marriage problems
and the conditions that can guarantee the existence of a stable matching in roommate
problems.3 Tan (1990) proposes a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a
stable matching in roommate problems with strict preferences. Chung (2000) introduces the
"no odd ring" condition and proves that the no odd ring condition is a su¢ cient condition
for the existence of a stable matching in roommate problems with weak preferences. Abeledo
and Isaak (1991) show that the set of mutually acceptable pairs can be viewed as a graph,
and a stable matching exists under any preference prole if and only if the acceptability
graph is bipartite.
Because the existence of a stable matching is not guaranteed in a roommate prob-
lem, one may ask whether we can nd matchings which always exist when we relax the
stability concept. Tan (1990) proposes an algorithm that nds a maximum stable match-
ing : A matching with maximum number of disjoint pairs of persons such that these pairs are
stable among themselves. Abraham et al. (2005) focus on nding almost stable matchings:
Matchings that admit fewer blocking pairs. In Klaus et al. (2008), it is shown that the
set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. They
assert that the set of absorbing matchings is the only solution concept that is core consis-
tent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core. Inarra et al. (2008,
2010) focus on solution concepts in unsolvable roommate problems such as P stability and
absorbing sets. They prove that absorbing sets always exist and if a stable matching exists,
the absorbing set coincides with the set of stable matchings. Moreover, an absorbing set
satises the outer stability ; i.e., all matchings that are not in the solution set are dominated
3Gale Shapley (1962), Irving (1985), Roth and Sotomayor (1990) have also investigated the stability
concept in marriage problems.
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by matchings in the solution set. They also show that the solutions that Tan (1990) and
Abraham et al. (2006) propose do not satisfy the outer stability property.
In this paper, we also study a sequential matching game. All existing studies
focus on the implementation of stable matchings in solvable matching problems, which is
reasonable, because the existence of a stable matching in roommate problems is guaranteed.
Yet, these studies do not provide much intuition about the characteristics of the equilibrium
outcome in a sequential game in a broader context, i.e., the roommate problem. As far as
we know, this is the rst study that focuses on a sequential game in a roommate problem.
In terms of implementation of stable matchings, two important studies are by Alcalde and
Romero-Medina (2000, 2005) and Sotomayor (2003), who study the implementation of the
core correspondence and/or the set of stable solutions of the college admissions problem.
Suh and Wen (2008) identify su¢ cient conditions to implement stable matchings in the
equilibrium of a sequential marriage problem, which we mimic in this paper. Some other
important studies that are interested in the implementation of stable solutions or the core
of the problem are Alcalde (1996), Shin and Suh (1996), and Kara and Sonmez (1996).
In section 2, we introduce the roommate problem. We also present the concepts
of stable partition and P   stability, and provide some preliminary results in section 2.
In section 3, we introduce the RP procedure and RP   stability. We discuss the stable
partition, P   stability and RP   stability concepts, and show how these concepts are
related. In Section 4, we introduce the sequential game and prove our results. Section 5
concludes.
The roommate problem
The set of individuals is dened by a nite set I = fi1; : : : ; ing. A roommate
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problem is a pair
 
I; (i)i2I

where for each individual i 2 I, i denotes is complete and
transitive preference relation dened over I. A preference prole is the collection of all
individualspreferences, i.e., = (i)i2I . We denote the strict preferences of i 2 I with i.
A matching is a function  : I  ! I such that each individual is matched to at most one
individual. If  (i) = j, then  (j) = i, and we say that i is matched to j in . If  (i) = i,
then i is unmatched in .
In this paper, we assume that individuals have strict preferences. When j i k, i
strictly prefers j to k if i 6= j 6= k 6= i. Individual i prefers being alone rather than being
matched to k, that is, k is unacceptable for i if i = j 6= k. Individual j is acceptable for
i if i = k 6= j. A matching  is individually rational if no individual i blocks , i.e.,  (i)
is acceptable to i. A pair fi; jg  I blocks  if j i  (i) and i j  (j). A matching 
is stable if it is individually rational and if there is no pair fi; jg  I that blocks . For a
set of individuals S  I, and any two matchings  and 0, we say that each individual in S
prefers  to 0 if  S 0. For two matchings  and 0,  Pareto dominates 0 if  I 0
and  S 0 for a nonempty set S  I.
A stable matching in a roommate problem may not exist. A roommate problem
is solvable if a stable matching exists; otherwise it is unsolvable. A marriage problem is a
special case of a roommate problem. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that a stable matching
always exists in a marriage problem. Hence, a marriage problem is considered as a solvable
roommate problem.
Preliminaries
This section presents the denitions of stable partitions (Tan, 1991) and P  
stability (Inarra et al., 2008). We also present some preliminary results that we benet
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throughout the paper. The rst result is related to solvable roommate problems.
Theorem 1 (Roth) In a marriage problem with strict preferences, the set of people who
are single is the same for all stable matchings.4
Given a roommate problem
 
I; (i)i2I

, an ordered subset of individuals A =
fa1 : : : ; akg  I is a ring if k  3 and ai+1 ai ai 1 ai ai for all i = 1; : : : ; k (mod k).5 A
ring is an odd ring if the number of individuals in the ring is odd, and is an even ring if
the number of individuals in the ring is even. The set A is a pair of mutually acceptable
individuals if k = 2 and ai 1 ai ai for all i = 1; 2. Set A is a singleton if k = 1. When we
say that a set is an odd set, we mean that the number of individuals in the set is odd, i.e.,
the set is either a singleton or an odd ring. A partition P of a set S  I is a collection of
disjoint subsets of S.
A stable partition P of I is such that
(i) For all A 2 P , the set A is a ring or a mutually acceptable pair of individuals or a
singleton, and
(ii) For any set A = fa1; : : : ; akg 2 P and B = fb1; : : : ; blg 2 P , if bj ai ai 1 with
bj 6= ai+1, then bj 1 bj ai for all i = 1; : : : ; k and j = 1; : : : ; l.
In the denition above, we do not necessarily have A 6= B. The case where A 6= B
can be thought as the stability between sets in the stable partition. The case where A = B
can be thought as the stability within the set. The second condition can also be written as
follows: For any ai 2 I, if there exists an individual aj such that aj 6= ai+1 and aj ai ai 1,
then aj 1 aj ai for all i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 1; : : : ; n.
The following results are by Tan (1991). The rst three of these results are about
the characteristics of stable partitions. The last result provides a necessary and su¢ cient
4Theorem 2.22 in Roth and Sotomayor, 1990.
5Hereafter we omit modulo k.
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condition to have a stable matching in a roommate problem with strict preferences. Then,
we introduce the P   stability concept proposed by Inarra et al. (2008).
Theorem 2 For any roommate problem (I; (i)i2I),
1. There exists at least one stable partition.
2. Any two stable partitions have exactly the same odd sets.
3. Each even ring of a stable partition can be broken into pairs of mutually acceptable
individuals preserving stability.
4. There is no stable matching if and only if there exists a stable partition with an odd
ring.
Denition 2 Given a stable partition P ,  is a P   stable matching if for each A =
fa1; : : : ; akg 2 P , (ai) 2 fai+1; ai 1g for all i = 1; : : : ; k except for a unique j such that
(aj) = aj if A is an odd set.
Because a stable partition exists for any roommate problem, a P stable matching
exists, too. By the second result of Theorem 2, without loss of generality, we only consider
stable partitions which do not contain even rings throughout the paper.
In a P   stable matching , exactly one individual in every odd set is unmatched.
Hence, the number of unmatched individuals in a P stablematching is equal to the number
of odd sets, i.e., the total number of odd rings and singletons. Suppose that an individual ai
in an odd ring is not matched to either of his neighbors in the ring in a P  stable matching
, whereas all other individuals in the odd ring are matched to their neighbors. In such a
case ai 1 and ai would prefer each other to their current mates in , but fai 1; aig is not
considered as a blocking pair in term of P   stability. We provide an example about stable
partitions and P   stability.
Example 3 A preference prole with 6 people is given below:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
2 3 1 2 6 5
3 1 2 4
4 6
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Figure 3. Stable Partition
The only stable partition is P = ff1; 2; 3g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg where A1 = f1; 2; 3g is an odd ring,
A2 = f4g is a singleton set, and A3 = f5; 6g is a pair of mutually acceptable individuals.
Figure 3 represents the stable partition P .The P   stable matchings are:
1 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg
2 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg
3 = ff1; 3g ; f2g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg
In example 3, for any P   stable matching, there are two individuals in the odd
ring who block the matching. For example, f2; 3g block 1, f1; 3g block 2, and f1; 2g
block 3. Consider the P   stable matching 3 in example 3. Pairs f1; 2g and f2; 4g are
not considered as blocking pairs for 3 in terms of P   stability. Individuals 1 and 2 are
in an odd ring in P , but 2 and 4 are not. Moreover, matching 2 and 4 is a Pareto im-
provement. Consider matching 0 = ff1; 3g ; f2; 4g ; f5; 6gg. The only blocking pair for 0
is f1; 2g. Moreover, the number of individuals who are matched is greater in 0 than that
in 3. Matching 
0 is an RP   stable matching. As in this example, two individuals who
do not involve in an odd ring cannot form a blocking pair in terms of RP   stability. We
introduce the RP   stability concept in the next section and show how RP   stability is
di¤erent from P   stability.
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The RP procedure and RP-stability
We introduce the RP procedure and RP   stability. We show that P   stability,
and RP   stability are not related unless the problem is solvable. Moreover, the number
of matched individuals in an RP   stable matching is greater than or equal to the number
of matched individuals in any P   stable matching. It is also true that if the problem is
solvable, stability, P   stability, and RP   stability are equivalent.
First, we introduce additional denitions. Given a prole  and a stable partition
P , when we cut an odd ring A = fa1; : : : ; akg by leaving ai out, we erase ai in ai 1s
preference lists and ai 1 in ais list. When we cut an odd ring A = fa1; : : : ; akg by leaving
ai out, we say "we cut A by ai" or "we cut ai 2 A".
After an odd ring is cut, we obtain a reduced preference prole 0. We obtain a
stable partition P 0 with respect to the reduced preference prole 0.6 Such a stable partition
is called a reduced stable partition. A reduced preference prole for which no reduced stable
partition has an odd ring is called a nal preference prole. A stable partition with respect
to a nal prole is called a nal stable partition.
An odd ring in a stable partition P may not appear in a reduced stable partition.
An odd ring A = fa1; : : : ; akg in a stable partition is an independent odd ring if for all ai
in A, if bi ai ai 1 for some bi 2 I, then bi is not in an odd ring in P .78 If, for some ci 2 I,
we have ci bi 1 bi or bi 1 and bi are neighbors in an odd ring A0 with ci 2 A0, then ci is
not in an odd ring in P . Eventually, we have an individual hi, who is not in an odd ring in
P , and there is no li 2 I with li hi 1 hi, or hi 1 and hi are neighbors in an odd ring A00
with li 2 A00. An odd ring which is not independent is a dependent odd ring. We discuss
6Hereafter, we say a stable partition P 0 whenever it is clear that the partition P 0 is stable with respect
to 0.
7Note that the subscript i is not necessarily the same number when used as the subscript of di¤erent
letters. For example, for two individuals ai and bi, if ai is a1, bi is not necessarily b1.
8Note that, by the stability of P , bi 1 bi ai, and so on so forth.
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some properties of independent odd rings after we introduce the RP procedure. Consider
the following example:
Example 4
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
4 3 1 5 6 4
2 1 2 6 5 5
3 1
The unique stable partition is P = ff1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5; 6gg. The odd ring f4; 5; 6g is an inde-
pendent odd ring, whilef1; 2; 3g is dependent because 4 1 3 and 4 is in an odd ring.
We introduce a procedure, the RP procedure, to obtain RP  stable matchings. A
reduced prole is obtained in each step of the procedure by cutting an odd ring in a stable
partition that is obtained in the previous step. In each step, if there is an independent ring in
a reduced stable partition, the procedure ignores the dependent rings in that partition, i.e.,
the procedure cuts only the independent rings in that partition. If there is no independent
ring, then the procedure cuts dependent rings.
The RP Procedure Given a prole , let P = fA; : : : ;Hg be a stable partition.
Step 1 If there exists an independent odd ring in P , choose an arbitrary independent
odd ring. Choose an arbitrary dependent odd ring otherwise. Let the chosen
odd ring be A. Obtain a reduced preference prole 1 by cutting a1 2 A 2 P .9
If 1 is a nal prole (a prole for which there is no stable partition with an
odd ring), obtain all P 1   stable matchings for any nal stable partition P 1 and
continue step k. Otherwise, continue step 2.
Step 2 Obtaining the reduced prole 2 by cutting
a11 2 A1 =

a11; a
1
2 : : : ; a
1
j
	 2 P 1:
9Note that in each step j of the procedure, all individuals are renumbered according to how they are
partitioned in some partition that is obtained in step j. We use superscript j for individuals, sets, partitions,
and proles to indicate step j.
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Repeat step 1.
. . .
Step k Let step k be the rst step that a nal prole k is reached by cutting
ak 11 2 Ak 1
n
ak 11 ; a
k 1
2 ; : : : ; a
k 1
j
o
2 P k 1:
Obtain all P k   stable matchings for any nal stable partition P k.
Step k + 1 Let j be the most recent step where an odd ring Aj in which there are
still some individuals who have not been used to cut the odd ring is cut. Repeat
step 1 by cutting Aj .
. . .
Step t The process stops when we cut all individuals in any odd ring that is obtained
in any step of the procedure (excluding the dependent odd rings if there is an
independent odd ring in the same reduced stable partition).
Denition 3 Given a preference prole, a matching  is RP   stable if  is obtained by
the RP procedure, i.e., is a P   stable matching with respect to a nal reduced prole in the
RP procedure.
We provide an example in the Appendix to show how to obtain RP   stable
matchings by the RP procedure. Note that an RP   stable matching can be obtained more
than once in di¤erent steps of the procedure. Because the purpose of the paper is not to
come up with an e¢ cient algorithm to obtain all RP   stable matchings, but to dene
RP   stability, a modication to overcome this problem is not considered in this paper.10
We now discuss some properties of independent rings. An independent odd ring
A 2 P can also be dened as an odd ring that appears in any reduced stable partition in
10McVitie and Wilson (1971) imposes further rules on the breakmarriage operation to overcome the
problem of obtaining the same stable solution many times.
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any step of the procedure until a 2 A 2 P j is cut in some step of the procedure. That is,
starting from P , no matter how and which odd ring except A is cut in any reduced stable
partition, A always appears as an odd ring in any reduced stable partition until a 2 A is
cut for some a 2 A in some step of the procedure. No individual ai in the independent odd
ring A, would have neighbors other than ai 1 and ai+1 unless A is cut. Independent rings
are "independent" of other odd rings in this sense.
Because an independent odd ring appears in any reduced stable partition no matter
how other odd rings are cut (until the independent odd ring is cut), if there are more
independent odd rings in some step of the procedure, it does not matter which independent
ring is chosen to cut. If there is no independent odd ring, it does not matter which dependent
odd ring is chosen to cut because as the procedure considers the most recent step where
an odd ring in which there are still some individuals who have not been used to cut the
odd ring, the procedure cuts all other dependent odd rings at any step of the procedure.
Furthermore, because any two stable partitions have the same odd rings by result 2 in
Theorem 2, the choice of the stable partition does not matter in any step of the procedure,
either.
One should note that neither P   stability nor RP   stability implies the other
in an unsolvable roommate problem. In Example 3, 3 = ff1; 3g ; f2g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg is a
P   stable matching, but not an RP   stable matching. On the other hand, matching
4 = ff1; 3g ; f2; 4g ; f5; 6gg is an RP   stable matching, but not a P   stable matching.
Although, there is no relation between P   stability and RP   stability in unsolvable
roommate problems, it is obvious that P   stability and RP   stability are equivalent in
solvable roommate problems. Because the set of P  stable matchings coincides with the set
of pairwise stable matchings in solvable roommate problems (Inarra et al, 2008), pairwise
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stability and RP   stability, too, are equivalent in solvable roommate problems.
As Example 3 shows, there may be more matched individuals in an RP   stable
matching compared to a P stable matching. Before we prove that an RP stable matching
matches more individuals than a P   stable matching, we introduce some new notation.
Let A () represent the set of all individuals in an odd ring in a partition, B () represent
the set of all individuals who involve in a set of mutually acceptable pair in a partition or
the set of matched individuals in a matching, and C () represents the set of all individuals
in singleton sets in a partition or the set of all unmatched individuals in a matching. Let
O () represents the set of all odds sets in a partition.
For an RP   stable matching , let P k be the nal reduced prole that  is
obtained, that is, k = . Moreover, P j is a reduced stable partition in an arbitrary
step j in the procedure through P k, and j is an arbitrary P j   stable matching for any
j = 1; : : : ; k   1. We make an assumption to simplify the analysis. We assume that for
any fai; ai 1g = B 2 P j for some pair B 2 P j , we keep fai; ai 1g as a pair in P j+1 if
possible while preserving stability in the partition. We make such an assumption because
we want individuals in even rings (if an even ring exists) to be partitioned in the same
way in adjacent steps. Without this assumption, the individuals in an even ring may be
partitioned di¤erently in P j and P j+1, but the number of matched individuals is the same.
Hence, our analysis is not a¤ected. So, without loss of generality, we assume a pair in P j is
kept as a pair in P j+1 while preserving stability, if possible. The following lemma is used
to prove our claim.
Lemma 5 For a stable partition P and an RP  stable matching , the number of odd sets
in P j is greater than or equal to the number of odd sets in P j+1 for all j = 1; : : : ; k   1.
Proof. Suppose that P j+1 is obtained by cutting aji 2 Aj 2 P j . There are three
possible cases to consider: (i) aji 2 C
 
P j+1

or (ii) aji 2 A
 
P j+1

, or (iii) aji 2 B
 
P j+1

.
45
Case (i): When we cut aji 2 Aj in P j , aji involves in a singleton in the reduced
stable partition P j+1. Note that for all bi 2 In
n
aji 1; ai
o
, bis preference ordering in step
j is preserved in step j + 1. Moreover, no new odd set which has aji and some other
individuals is formed; the partition of individuals in InAj in P j+1 and P j is the same
(by our assumption). Hence, there is one less odd ring and one more singleton in P j+1;O  P j = O  P j+1.
Case (ii): When we cut aji 2 Aj in P j , aji involves in an odd ring in the reduced
stable partition P j+1. Let Aj+1 2 P j+1 be the odd ring such that aji 2 Aj+1. We claim
that Aj+1 =
n
aji ; b; b
0; : : : c; c0
o
with fi; i0g is a pair in P j for all i = b; : : : ; c. That is,
i and i0 cannot be from di¤erent sets in P j for all i = b; : : : ; c. This is because there
is stability among pairs in P j , and when the stable partition P j+1 is obtained from P j ,
preference orderings of individuals in In
n
aji 1; a
j
i
o
do not change. Hence, if two individuals
in a pair of P j involve in an odd set in P j+1, they appear as a pair in that odd set of
P j+1. Now, because when an individual i 2 B  P j involves in an odd ring in P j+1,
his partner in the pair also involves in that odd ring; there is no individual i such that
i 2 B  P j and i 2 A  P j+1[C  P j+1. Hence, no odd set other than Aj+1 is formed, i.e.,O  P j = O  P j+1.
Case (iii): When we cut aji 2 Aj in P j , aji involves in a pair in the reduced stable
partition P j+1. Let
n
aji ; bi
o
2 P j+1. Suppose that bi 2 C
 
P j
 [ A  P j. Now, because bi
is in a pair in P j+1, the odd set that contains bi in P j , say Sj 2 P j , does no longer an odd
ring in P j+1. In fact, we have either Sjn fbig = ; or the individuals in Sjn fbig form pairs.
Hence, no new odd set is formed, and we have
O  P j > O  P j+1. If bi 2 B  P j, then
an individual ci 2 B
 
P j

(not necessarily ci = bi 1) appears either in a singleton in P j+1
or in an odd ring in P j+1. Hence,
O  P j = O  P j+1.
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We consider each possible case and conclude that
O  P j  O  P j+1. The
proof is complete.
Proposition 9 Given a stable partition P and an RP   stable matching , the number of
matched individuals in  is greater than or equal to the number of matched individuals in
any P 0   stable matching 0 for any stable partition P 0.
Proof. If there is no odd ring in P , then there is no odd ring in P 0 either by
Theorem 2. Hence, 0 and  are stable matchings. By Theorem 1, the set of matched
individuals in  and 0 are the same; we are done.
Now, consider the case where there is an odd ring in P . We know that for any
stable partition P , the number of unmatched individuals in a P  stable matching is equal
to the number of odd sets in P Hence, the number of unmatched individuals in k =  is
equal to the number of odd sets in the nal stable partition P k. Similarly, the number of
unmatched individuals in 0 is equal to the number of odd sets in P 0. Hence, in order to
show that the number of matched individuals in  is greater than that in 0, it is enough
to show that O j(P 0)j  O  P k.
By Theorem 2, O (P ) = O (P 0). By lemma 5,
jO (P )j  jO (P1)j  : : :  jO (Pk)j :
Hence, jO (P 0)j  jO (Pk)j.
A sequential matching mechanism
In this section, we introduce a sequential matching mechanism and analyze the
SPE outcome of this mechanism. We show that the RP procedure can be used to identify
all potential SPE outcomes of the mechanism for any order of individualsmoves.
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For an RP   stable matching , let 0 be a matching which is preferred to  by
a set of individuals S. Moreover, each individual in set S is matched to an individual in
 (S) under 0 and each individual not in S is matched to his  partner under 0. That is,
for any RP   stable matching , let 0 be such that 0 S , 0 (S) =  (S) for some S  I
with S 6= ;, and 0 (i) =  (i) for all i 2 In (S [ 0 (S)). Matching 0 is said to be obtained
from  by favoring set S. We argue that the SPE outcome of the sequential game is either
an RP   stable matching or a matching that is obtained from an RP   stable matching by
favoring some set S  I.
The sequential matching mechanism considered in this paper is an n stage extensive
form game of perfect information. The order of moves is given by a surjective function
 : f1; : : : ; ng  ! I, where  (k) denotes the individual who moves in the kth stage of the
mechanism.
In stage 1,  (1) either proposes to a potential roommate or chooses to be single.
Whenever  (1) is indi¤erent between proposing to a roommate and choosing to remain
single, he chooses to remain single.
In stage k, 1 < k < n, after observing the history of the game up to stage k,  (k)
either (i) accepts one potential roommate who has proposed to her in a previous stage, or
(ii) proposes to a potential roommate who will move in a subsequent stage, or (iii) chooses to
remain single. Whenever  (k) is indi¤erent between proposing to a roommate and choosing
to remain single, he chooses to remain single.
In stage n,  (n) either accepts one potential roommate who has proposed to her
in a previous stage, or chooses to remain single.
There is a di¤erent sequential mechanism for every order of moves. Given an
order of moves, the outcome of the mechanism is a matching. This is because an individual
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cannot accept more than one proposal, and by making a proposal or by deciding to remain
single, she must reject all proposals that have been received. Because preferences are strict,
the SPE outcome of the mechanism for a given an order of moves is unique. Observe that
the SPE outcome of the game is an individually rational matching. This is because an
individual i would choose to remain single rather than proposing to or accepting a proposal
from someone who is not acceptable for i.
We know that odd rings play an important role for the existence of a stable match-
ing in roommate problems. In this section, we focus on the role of odd rings in the sequential
mechanism. The following example is an example of the role that odd rings play on the
equilibrium path of any mechanism (the preference prole in this example is the same with
the one that is used in Appendix).
Example 5 Consider the preference prole below:
1 2 3 4 5
         
2 3 1 5 2
3 1 2 2 4
4
5
The unique stable partition is P = ff1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5gg. The unique odd ring in P is A =
f1; 2; 3g. Depending on the order of individuals moves, an individual in f1; 2; 3g is matched
to someone not in the ring or is unmatched in the SPE. The individual in f1; 2; 3g who is
matched to someone not in the ring or is unmatched in the SPE may involve in other odd
rings with other individuals. For example, consider the following order of moves: 1; 2; 3; 4; 5.
On the equilibrium path, we observe that 2 never receives a proposal from 1 and cannot
propose to 3. This is because if 1 proposes to 2, he will be rejected in favor of 3. Then,
1 proposes to 3. Hence, 2 will be rejected in favor of 1 if he proposes to 3. When we cut
2 2 f1; 2; 3g, we obtain another stable partition P 1 = ff1; 3g ; f2; 4; 5gg. That is, individual
2 involves in another odd ring f2; 4; 5g. In this odd ring, 4 never receives a proposal from
2 and cannot propose to 5 by the same logic. When we cut 4 2 f2; 4; 5g, we obtain P 2 =
ff1; 3g ; f2; 5g ; f4gg. Because there is no odd ring in P 2, we obtain all P 2 stable matchings.
Thus, 2 = ff1; 3g ; f2; 5g ; f4gg is an RP   stable matching. Matching 2 is also the SPE
outcome of the sequential mechanism.
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Consider a sequential mechanism and suppose that there is an odd ring A =
fa; : : : ; kg such that a is the rst one to move. On the equilibrium path, suppose that a
cannot propose to b because if he does so, b is matched to c, d is matched to e, and so
on so forth. In such a situation, we say that a and b face an odd ring. Obviously, when
two individuals face an odd ring on the equilibrium path, they cannot be matched in the
SPE. Let fa1; a2g be a pair in some set A of a stable partition P . By the stability of P ,
for any bi 2 I such that a1 bi bi 1 and for any ci such that a2 ci ci 1, we have a2 a1 bi
and a1 a2 ci, respectively. Hence, if a1 and a2 do not face an odd ring on the equilibrium
path, then they are not matched in the SPE only if one of them gets an opportunity to be
matched to someone more preferred. This is equal to say that if a1 and a2 are not matched
in the SPE, then either they face an odd ring on the equilibrium path or one of them gets
an opportunity to be matched to someone more preferred. By using this logic, we prove the
following lemma, which is used to prove our main result in this section.
Proposition 10 For any odd ring A = fa1; : : : ; akg 2 P , if A is an independent odd ring,
then ai never receives a proposal from or proposes to an individual b such that b ai ai 1
and b 6= aj+1 when everybody plays his equilibrium strategy in the sequential mechanism for
all ai 2 A.
Proof. Suppose there is an independent odd ring A = fa1; : : : ; akg 2 P . On the
contrary, suppose that for some ai 2 A, ai rejects ai 1 in favor of an individual bi 6= ai+1
when ai 1 proposes to ai in a sequential mechanism. Because bi ai ai 1, we must have
bi 1 bi ai by the stability of P . Then, bi can only be available for ai either because bi 1
and bi are in an odd ring, or bi 1 gets an opportunity to be matched with someone whom
he prefers to bi. Hence, there is an individual ci 2 I such that either ci bi 1 bi or ci 2 A0
with A0 being an odd ring and fbi 1; big being a pair in A0. Because A is an independent
odd ring, A0 62 P by the denition of an independent odd ring. The fact that A0 62 P implies
that ci becomes available for someone less preferred than ci 1. By a similar argument, this
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is possible only if ci 1 and ci are in an odd ring, or ci 1 gets an opportunity to be matched
with someone whom he prefers to ci. Hence, there is an individual di 2 I such that either
di ci 1 ci or di 2 A00 with A00 being an odd ring and fci 1; cig being a pair in A00. By
repeating the same argument, in any step of the argument that is considered, there must be
an individual li, who becomes available for someone less preferred than li 1, because either
li 1 and li are in an odd ring, or li 1 gets an opportunity to be matched with someone
whom he prefers to li. Hence, the argument continues. However, because there is a nite
number of people, the argument must have nite steps, contradiction.
Proposition 10 implies that if there is an independent odd ring in a stable partition,
then everyone except one person in the odd ring is matched to one of his neighbors in the
independent odd ring, and one person is matched to someone worse than his preceding
individual.
In order to prove that the SPE outcome of a sequential game is either an RP  
stable matching or a matching that is obtained from an RP   stable matching by favoring
a set of individuals, we focus on the RP   stable matchings that are obtained by following
a particular path in the procedure. That is, we choose an RP   stable matching that can
be obtained by breaking odd rings in a specic order which is consistent with the sequential
mechanism considered, i.e., the order in which individuals move. Consider the following
example:
Example 6 Consider the preference prole given in example 4:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
4 3 1 5 6 4
2 1 2 6 4 5
3 1
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The unique stable partition is P = ff1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5; 6gg. The RP   stable matchings are:
1 = ff1; 4g ; f2; 3g ; f5; 6gg
2 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 6g ; f5gg
3 = ff1; 3g ; f2g ; f4; 6g ; f5gg
4 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4; 6g ; f5gg
5 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 5g ; f6gg
6 = ff1; 3g ; f2g ; f4; 5g ; f6gg
7 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4; 5g ; f6gg
Because f4; 5; 6g is an independent ring, we start cutting f4; 5; 6g. In the RP procedure,
when we cut 4, f1; 2; 3g, which is a dependent ring in P , disappears in the reduced prole,
and we obtain the nal partition ff1; 4g ; f2; 3g ; f5; 6gg. Hence, we obtain 1. When we
continue the procedure by cutting 5 or 6, f1; 2; 3g appears as an independent ring (the only
ring) in any reduced stable partition. Hence, we continue cutting f1; 2; 3g by each individual
in it.
In any sequential mechanism, because f4; 5; 6g is an independent ring, there is
no individual i 2 f4; 5; 6g such that  (i) i i  1, and exactly one individual in f4; 5; 6g is
matched to someone else other than his neighbors. Observe that if 4 is the one who cannot be
matched to one of his neighbors, then 4 becomes available for 1, and 4 and 1 are matched in
the SPE. The ring f1; 2; 3g is not e¤ective, i.e., no individual in the ring f1; 2; 3g is left out
because of the ring f1; 2; 3g. Hence, the way that 1, 2, and 3 are ordered is irrelevant. This
is similar to the fact that f1; 2; 3g disappears in the reduced prole when we cut 4. If either
5 or 6 is cut in a mechanism, then the order of 1, 2, and 3 matters. Those individuals who
are matched and the one who is unmatched depend on order of 1, 2, and 3. This is similar
to the fact that when we cut 5 or 6 in the procedure, f1; 2; 3g appears as an independent
ring (the only ring) in any reduced stable partition, and we continue cutting f1; 2; 3g by each
individual in it.
On the equilibrium path in a sequential mechanism, there is a particular order in
which the odd rings become e¤ective. To prove our main result, we construct a particular
order of cutting odd rings in the procedure that is consistent with the particular order
in which the odd rings become e¤ective in the sequential mechanism considered, by using
Proposition 10. The outline of the proof is as follows: We start with showing how to
construct that particular order of cutting rings. Moreover, we show that the prole that we
reach by cutting the odd rings according to that particular order is a nal prole that can
be obtained by the procedure. Hence, if the SPE outcome is a P   stable matching with
respect to that nal prole, it is an RP   stable matching. We nish the proof by showing
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that if the SPE outcome is not a P   stable matching with respect to that nal prole,
then it is a matching that is obtained from an RP   stable matching by favoring a set of
individuals. Now, we prove our main result.
Theorem 3 Given a preference prole , the SPE outcome of any sequential matching
mechanism is either an RP   stable matching or a matching that is obtained from an
RP   stable matching by favoring a set of individuals.
Proof. Consider an order of individuals and let  be the SPE outcome of the
game. Let P be a stable partition. By Proposition 10, we know that if there is an inde-
pendent odd ring A = fa1; : : : ; akg in P , then no individual aj in A gets an opportunity to
be matched to an individual b such that b aj aj 1 and b 6= aj+1. Moreover, there is one
individual ai 2 A who cannot be matched to ai 1 and becomes available for other individ-
uals who prefer ai more than their preceding individuals in some sets of P (if there is any
such individual). Hence, we eliminate ai and ai 1 from each others preference prole and
obtain a reduced stable partition P 1. Observe that no individuals actions are a¤ected on
the equilibrium path when we eliminate ai and ai 1 from each others preference prole. In
order to see this, observe that each individual plays only once in the sequential mechanism.
Hence, once ai 1 cannot propose to ai (or ai cannot propose to ai 1) on the equilibrium
path because of the odd ring A, ai can no longer be a thread for a possible partnership of
ai 1 with another individual on the equilibrium path. That is, on the equilibrium path,
when taking an action, each individual takes the fact in to account that ai and ai 1 cannot
be matched. Hence, there is no individual b in In fai 2; ai 1; aig such that ai 1 rejects b in
favor of ai or ai does not propose to b because he has an o¤er from ai. We can conclude
that no individuals actions are a¤ected on the equilibrium path when we eliminate ai and
ai 1 from each others preference prole.
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Similarly, if there is an independent odd ring in a reduced prole, we can continue
the process by cutting the independent odd ring by the individual who cannot be matched
to his preceding or succeeding individuals in the ring. By the same logic, as we continue the
process by cutting the independent odd rings accordingly, no individuals actions are a¤ected
on the equilibrium path when we eliminate two successive individuals in the independent
odd ring from each others preference prole.
Consider an arbitrary step j of the procedure. Suppose that step j is the rst step
such that there is no independent odd ring in any stable partition. If there are dependent odd
rings, then the procedure cuts an arbitrary dependent odd ring by an arbitrary individual
in step j. The choice of the dependent odd ring does not matter because after a nal
stable partition is reached, the procedure considers the most recent prole with an odd ring
such that not all individuals in the odd ring is used to cut the ring. Hence, all dependent
rings in step j are cut one by one by each individual in the ring. As a result, any ring
(whether independent or dependent) that individuals face on the equilibrium path is cut by
the procedure. The particular order of cutting rings that is consistent with the sequential
game must be one of those paths that the procedure reaches. That is, the nal prole that is
reached when we cut the odd rings in a way that is consistent with the order of individuals
is one of the nal proles that is reached by the procedure.
On the path that is consistent with the order of individuals, consider the nal step
k, where we obtain the nal prole k. For any individual ai 2 I, if b is eliminated from
ais list, then b and ai involve in an odd ring in some step j and cannot be matched because
of the odd ring in . Hence,  (ai) is in ais list in k. Let P k be a nal stable partition
with respect to k and k be an P k stable matching. If  = k, then  is an RP stable
matching, and hence, the proof is done. Now, suppose that  6= k. We aim to show that
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 is such that  S k,  (S) = k (S) for a nonempty set S  I, and  (i) = k (i) for
all i 2 In (S [  (S)).
Let S be the set of all individuals who prefer  to k. First, we show that S 6= ;.
Let ai 2 I be such that  (ai) 6= k (ai). If  (ai) ai k (ai), then ai 2 S, and S 6= ;. If
k (ai) ai  (ai), then we know that either ai and k (ai) are in an odd ring in P k or k (ai)
gets an opportunity to be matched with someone whom he prefers to ai. Because P k is a
nal stable partition, there is no odd ring in P k. Hence, we must have 
 
k (ai)
 k(ai) ai,
which implies that k (ai) 2 S 6= ;. Second, we show that  (S) = k (S). If k (S) 6=
 (S), there exists an individual a 2 S such that  (a) 62 k (S). Note that  (a) 62 k (S)
implies k ( (a)) 62 S. Because a 2 S,  (a) = a a k (a). By the stability of P k,
k (a) a a. Because there is no odd ring in P k and because a is matched with someone
worse than k (a), k (a) must get an opportunity to be matched with someone whom he
prefers to a in . That is, 
 
k (a)
 k(a) a. Hence, k (a) 2 S, contradiction. We
conclude that  (S) = k (S).
Because S is the set of all individuals who prefer  to k, by the stability of
P k, k (S) (or  (S)) must the set of all individuals who prefer k to . Then, for all
i 2 In (S [  (S)), we have k (i) =  (i). Thus, if  6= k, then  is such that  S k
for a nonempty set S  I, and  (i) = k (i) for all i 2 In (S [  (S)). The proof is
complete.
A matching that is obtained from an RP stable matching by favoring a nonempty
set of individuals is not necessarily RP   stable. Suppose that  is obtained from an
RP stable matching 0 by favoring a nonempty set of individuals S, and is not RP stable.
As it can also be seen in the proof of Theorem 3, there is no fa; 0 (a)g 2 0 such that
fa; 0 (a)g blocks . That is, only certain types of blocking pairs can be observed in the
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SPE. Hence, if we can rule out only these certain types of blocking pairs, the SPE outcome
 is an RP stablematching. In other words, if we can rule out only the unstable matchings
that are obtained from RP   stable matchings by favoring some set of individuals, we can
guarantee the stability of the SPE outcome. By taking this fact into account, we introduce
a su¢ cient condition to guarantee the stability of the SPE outcome regardless of the order
of individuals in a solvable roommate problem in the next section.
A su¢ cient condition to implement pairwise stable matchings
In this section, we focus on solvable roommate problems and on the pairwise
stability concept. Our purpose is to introduce a su¢ cient condition to guarantee the pairwise
stability of the SPE outcome of the mechanism for any order of individualsmoves in solvable
roommate problems. Before we focus on the stability of the SPE, we want to explore the
relation between pairwise stability, P   stability, and RP   stability.
Given a preference prole, there is no odd ring in a stable partition if and only
if there exists a stable matching by Theorem 2. Hence, for a solvable roommate problem,
each P  stable matching is a stable matching. Moreover, for a solvable roommate problem,
because there is no odd ring in any stable partition for the given preference prole, RP  
stability and P   stability, and hence, pairwise stability are equivalent by denition.
Now, we focus on implementing stable matchings in the SPE. Although a stable
matching exists for any solvable roommate problem, the SPE outcome may not be stable
for some order of individualsmoves as shown in the following example.
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Example 7
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
6 6 5 1 2 3
4 5 6 2 3 1
5 4 4 3 1 2
1 2 3 4 5 6
There is a unique stable partition P = ff1; 4g ; f2; 5g ; f3; 6gg and hence, the unique P  
stable and also RP   stable and pairwise stable matching is  = ff1; 4g ; f2; 5g ; f3; 6gg.
Consider matching  = ff1; 4g ; f2; 6g ; f3; 5gg, which is unstable because it is blocked by
the pair f1; 6g. Observe that  can be obtained from  by favoring S = f2; 5g. Furthermore,
observe that the SPE outcome of the mechanism when the individuals move as 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6
is  = ff1; 4g ; f2; 6g ; f3; 5gg.
As in the above example, the SPE outcome may not be RP   stable and hence,
may not be stable in a solvable roommate problem. Consider a solvable roommate problem.
Let  be in the SPE. We know by Theorem 3 that if  is not RP   stable, then  can
be obtained from an RP   stable matching by favoring a group of individuals. Hence, a
su¢ cient condition to guarantee the stability of the SPE outcome in a sequential mechanism
would then require that any matching that is obtained from an RP   stable matching by
favoring a set of individuals S  I is stable. We formally present our result in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4 Consider a solvable roommate problem. Let  be a stable matching. If any
matching that is obtained through an RP   stable matching by favoring a set of individuals
S  I is stable, then the SPE outcome of the sequential game is stable regardless of the
order of individuals.
In the previous section, we show that the SPE outcome for a given mechanism is
either an RP stablematching or can be obtained from an RP stablematching by favoring
a group of individuals. However, not all RP   stable matchings are implementable in the
SPE. In fact, not all pairwise stable matchings are implementable in the SPE. We provide
an example of a solvable roommate problem and show that there exists a pairwise stable
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matching such that there is no order of moves for which this pairwise stable matching is in
the SPE. By doing so, we also prove that not all RP stablematchings are implementable in
the SPE because pairwise stability and RP   stability are equivalent in solvable roommate
problems.
Example 8 Consider the following preference prole:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
4 5 6 2 3 1
5 6 4 3 1 2
6 4 5 1 2 3
1 2 3 4 5 6
The pairwise stable matchings are 1 = ff1; 4g ; f2; 5g ; f3; 6gg, 2 = ff1; 5g ; f2; 6g ; f3; 4gg,
and 3 = ff1; 6g ; f2; 4g ; f3; 5gg. In any given mechanism, whoever moves rst always
proposes to his or her top ranked person. Observe that for any i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g, i is the
last ranked person in the preference list of his top ranked person, and i is the second ranked
person in the preference list of his second ranked person. Because individuals are symmetric
in this sense, if we prove that 1 proposes to 4 in any mechanism with 1 being the rst person
to move, we show that whoever moves rst always proposes to his top ranked person. If 1
proposes to 4, then 6 misses the opportunity to be matched to his top ranked choice 1. The
best 6 can do is to be matched to 2. Thus, the worst 2 can do is to be matched to 6. Hence,
4 never gets the opportunity to be matched to 2. Then, the best 4 can do is to be matched
to 3, and the worst 3 can do is to be matched to 4. Hence, 5 never gets the opportunity to
be matched to 3. Because 1 has proposed to 4, 4 is not available for 5, either. Thus, the
best 5 can do is to be matched to 2. Hence, 2 cannot do worse than matching to be 5, which
implies that 6 cannot be matched to 2. Then, the only individual whom 6 can be matched
is 3. So, if 1 proposes 4, the SPE outcome is ff1; 4g ; f2; 5g ; f3; 6gg. We conclude that
in any mechanism, whoever moves rst always proposes to his top ranked person. Hence,
the pairwise stable matching 2 in which everybody is matched to his or her second ranked
choice, is not the SPE outcome for any order of individualsmoves.
Conclusion
We introduce RP   stability concept such that an RP   stable matching allows
more individuals to be matched compared to a P   stable matching and is blocked by only
a certain type of a blocking pair. In particular, if two individuals block an RP   stable
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matching, then they must involve in an odd ring. We propose a procedure, which is called
RP procedure, to obtain RP   stable matchings.
We also employ a sequential matching mechanism to understand the characteristics
of the SPE outcome of this mechanism in a roommate problem. We show that the RP
procedure can be used to identify the SPE outcomes of the sequential mechanism for any
order of individualsmoves. By analyzing the characteristics of the RP   stability and the
relation between the procedure and the sequential game, we are able to propose a su¢ cient
condition to guarantee the stability of the SPE outcome regardless of the order of individuals
in the mechanism.
We plan to investigate how the RP   stability concept is related to other solution
concepts that are proposed for roommate problems. We also plan to investigate if the set
of RP   stable matchings are absorbing sets or not and whether the set of RP   stable
matchings satises the outer stability or whether there is a random path from an unstable
matching to an RP   stable matching.
Appendix
Example: How to obtain MP   stable matchings. Consider the preference prole below:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
2 3 1 2 6 4
3 1 2 5 4 5
4 6 6
There is a unique stable partition P = ff1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5; 6gg. Let A = f1; 2; 3g, and
B = f4; 5; 6g. Observe that A is the only independent ring. Hence, we cut 1 2 A.
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The preference prole obtained 1 is shown below:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
2 3 2 2 6 4
1 6 5 4 5
4 6
The unique stable partition is P 1 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 5; 6gg. The odd ring B =
f4; 5; 6gis the unique odd ring in P 2. We cut 4 2 B and obtain 2:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
2 3 2 2 6 5
1 6 5 4
4
The unique stable partition is P 2 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg. There is no odd ring
in P 2. Hence, P 2 is a nal stable partition and 1 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg is an
RP   stable matching. We turn back to the most recent step in which there is an odd
ring such that not all individual are considered in the cutting process, yet. Hence, in
the third step, we consider 1 again. We cut 5 2 B and obtain 3 as below:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
2 3 2 2 6 4
1 6 6 5
4 5
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The unique stable partition is P 3 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 6g ; f5gg and P 3 is a nal stable
partition. We obtain an RP   stable matching 2 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 6g ; f5gg. We
continue with P 1 and cut 6 2 B to obtain 4:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
2 3 2 2 4 4
1 6 5
4 6
The unique stable partition is P 4 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 5g ; f6gg and P 4 is a nal stable
partition. We obtain an RP   stable matching 3 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 5g ; f6gg. The
most recent step in which there is an odd ring such that not all individual are con-
sidered in the cutting process is step 1. We continue with A and cut 2 2 A to obtain
5:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
3 3 1 2 6 4
4 2 5 4 5
6 6
The unique stable partition is P 5 = ff1; 3g ; f2; 4g ; f5; 6gg and P 5 is a nal stable
partition. We obtain an RP   stable matching 4 = ff1; 3g ; f2; 4g ; f5; 6gg. We
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continue with odd ring A and cut 3 2 A to obtain 6:
1 2 3 4 5 6
           
2 1 1 2 6 4
3 4 6 5 4 5
6
The unique stable partition is P 5 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4; 5; 6gg. We cut 4 2 B and
obtain 5 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg. In the following two steps we cut 5 2 B
and obtain 6 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4; 6g ; f5gg, and we cut 6 2 B and obtain 7 =
ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4; 5g ; f6gg.
All RP   stable matching are given below:
1 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg
2 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 6g ; f5gg
3 = ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 5g ; f6gg
4 = ff1; 3g ; f2; 4g ; f5; 6gg
5 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4g ; f5; 6gg
6 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4; 6g ; f5gg
7 = ff1; 2g ; f3g ; f4; 5g ; f6gg
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CHAPTER IV
REGIONAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: A WELFARE
ANALYSIS
Introduction
The lack of a forcing authority in trade relations of world countries makes it dif-
cult to achieve a trade agreement that increases world welfare. This creates a structural
problem of rules in trade agreements that will self-enforce the trading countries to achieve
a more liberal trade. In this paper, we study these self-enforcing rules with asymmetric
countries from the perspective of regional and multilateral trade agreements. In particu-
lar, we attempt to nd an answer to the question of "Why are trade agreements mostly
regional/preferential rather than multilateral?". By employing a welfare analysis, we show
that the existence of transportation costs may be a possible reason.
We present an N -good-N -country partial equilibrium model by generalizing the
2-good-2-country model in Bond and Park (2002) through considering transportation costs.
For simplicity, we assume that the downward-sloped demand curve and upward-sloped sup-
ply curve of each good in each country are linear in price of the good. We allow asymmetries
between countries in terms of country sizes and comparative advantages. We show that in-
ternational trade between any two countries is achieved through di¤erences in supply and
demand structures of the countries. After considering transportation cost between any two
countries, it follows that the equilibrium autarky price (for each good) in any country de-
pends on the individual country specic demand and supply structure, while the equilibrium
price (for each good) under international trade depends on the demand and supply struc-
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tures of all countries together with country-specic tari¤ rates and transportation costs.
According to the model, national welfare is dened as the sum of consumer surplus, pro-
ducer surplus and tari¤ incomes. We let each country to receive all the tari¤ income for
the good that the country imports.
In order to analyze the optimal tari¤ setting behavior of each country, we employ
the following approach in the theoretical analysis: First, we nd the Nash tari¤ rates
and best response functions. Each country maximizes its welfare given the tari¤ rate of
other countries. We show that the Nash tari¤ rates are decreasing in transportation costs;
i.e., closer countries tend to have higher tari¤ rates between each other, which lead to
lower trade volume across them. This suggests that there is a potential gain from a trade
agreement between closer countries in the short run. Moreover, while smaller countries set
lower optimal tari¤ rates to larger countries, larger countries set higher optimal tari¤ rates
to smaller countries. Then, we compare regional and multilateral trade agreements when
countries involve a stationary dynamic tari¤ game, i.e., countries play a repeated game for
tari¤ rates. The repeated structure of the game gives more exibility to our model in terms
of incorporating the self-enforcement agreements. In this game, each country is able to
compare future payo¤s out of a possible collusion (cooperation) with future payo¤s out of a
possible deviation from the agreement. In order to sustain collusion in a trade agreement,
the trade-o¤ between the gains from deviating from an agreed-upon tari¤ policy and the
discounted expected future gains from collusion must be balanced in a way that the latter
should keep away countries from deviating. We show that it is harder to make an agreement
for any country if the transportation cost is higher; i.e., countries tend to sustain regional
agreements to maximize their long-run welfare.
The relation between geography and trade agreements has been previously studied
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in the literature starting with Viner (1950) who has mentioned departures from the Most
Favored Nation (MFN) principle between countries within Europe going as far back as the
nineteenth century.1 Nevertheless, instead of explaining these agreements through trade
costs, Viner has reasoned them to "close ties of sentiment and interest arising out of ethno-
logical, or cultural, or historical political a¢ liations". Other earlier studies such as Meade
(1955) and Lipsey (1957) havent mentioned about a possible e¤ect of transportation costs
on regional trade agreements either.
Recently, Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981), Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Krug-
man (1991, 1993), Summers (1991), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), and Bhagwati and
Panagariya (1996) have attempted to nd whether or not proximity between countries have
made regional agreements more benecial compared to non-regional agreements. In par-
ticular, Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) assign an important role to transportation costs
in their analysis, but their study has been criticized by Berglas (1983) and Panagariya
(1998) in the sense that the transportation costs have to be too high in order to talk about
the e¤ect of transportation costs on regional trade agreements. Besides, following Krug-
man (1991), other studies such as Frankel (1997), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), Frankel
and Wei (1997) have also advocated for the e¤ect of transportation costs on regional trade
agreements. However, building on the earlier critique in Bhagwati (1993) and Bhagwati and
Panagariya (1996), Panagariya (1997) has shown that transportation costs are not di¤erent
than any other costs and hence should not deserve any special attention in explaining the
regional trade agreements.
In terms of methodology, the common question in the literature asked is whether
1As Panagariya (2000) states, MFN is the centerpiece of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade
(GATT) that governs the international trade in goods. In particular, MFN refers to the trade policy in
which each World Trade Organization (WTO) member grants to all members the same advantage, privilege,
favor, or immunity that it grants to any other country.
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tari¤ reductions with nearby partners are welfare improving. Krugman (1991), Frankel
Sten and Wei (1995), and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) have examined this particular
question by considering whether exogenously given preferential tari¤ reductions are welfare
improving in a model where there are di¤ering levels of transport costs between trading
partners. This approach has been extended by Bond (2001) who concentrates on preferential
tari¤ reductions by self-enforcing agreements in a four-country world.
In particular, Bond (2001) assumes that the world is divided into two continents,
with two countries located on each continent. There is a per unit cost on any good imported
from a country on the other continent, but zero transportation cost on goods coming from
the country on the same continent. He shows that Nash equilibrium tari¤s on regional
trading partners are higher than those on the distant partners. As Bond (2001) claims in
the conclusion of his paper, one might anticipate that this fact would make it more di¢ cult
to support trade liberalization with nearby countries, because the incentive to deviate at
a given agreement tari¤ would be higher. However, he shows that this e¤ect is o¤set by
the fact that the welfare level under regional free trade agreements is higher than that
with a distant partner (with given internal tari¤s). This is due to the fact that free trade
agreements with distant partners have higher external tari¤s against all countries, which
leads to lower world welfare under distant free trade agreements. In sum, Bond (2001)
shows that the equilibrium with regional trade agreements yields higher welfare.2 This
paper follows a similar approach with Bond (2001), but our analysis di¤ers from his paper
by considering an N -country model. In Bonds notation, instead of comparing the Nash
equilibrium tari¤ rates within and across continents under transportation costs, we directly
measure the e¤ect of transportation costs on the Nash equilibrium tari¤ rates ofN countries.
2Most recently, by working out optimal tari¤s with transport costs, Zissimos (2007) also shows that trade
based gains to a block with countries of the same region are higher than gains to an agreement involving
(distant) countries from di¤erent regions.
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Another topic that has been studied in the literature is the relation between pref-
erential and multilateral agreements. Common questions that have been investigated are
whether the trade liberalization is achieved through preferential agreements or multilateral
agreements, whether preferential agreements are building blocks or stumbling blocks for
multilateral agreements, and whether bilateralism or multilateralism is a better strategy
for countries. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) study a competing exporters model with three
countries to identify the di¤erent circumstances under which the preferential agreements
can lead to multilateral agreements or block them. Other studies that investigate the re-
lation between preferential and multilateral agreements in di¤erent settings are Bagwell
and Staiger (1997a,b) (1999), Bond and Syropoulos (1995), Bond Syropoulos and Winters
(2001). All of these studies assume that countries can commit tari¤ rates under prefer-
ential agreements, hence, only the multilateral agreements must be self-enforcing. In our
paper, we do not make such an assumption about preferential agreements, i.e., preferen-
tial agreements must be self-enforcing, too. A recent study which also aims to explain
the tendency toward regionalism is Freund (2000). Freund analyzes the relation between
preferential and multilateral agreements in a model of imperfect competition, and argues
that a multilateral tari¤ agreement creates the incentives to form a preferential agreement
with a higher probability that the preferential agreement is self-enforcing. Limao (2007)
investigates the e¤ects of preferential trade agreements on global free trade when countries
are also motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues. Limao argues that the preferential
agreements motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues increase the cost of multilateral
tari¤ reductions and, hence, decrease the likelihood of a multilateral free trade agreement.
Another recent study, Saggi and Yildiz (2010), focus on the comparison of bilateralism and
multilateralism through trade liberalization. They employ a competing exporters model in
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which tari¤ rates are determined endogenously. They argue that when countries have sym-
metric endowments, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade, but when
countries are asymmetric in terms of endowments, global free trade is stable (for a large set
of parameters) only through bilateral agreements. In our model, countries do not compete
over the goods that they export because each country exports only one good. Hence, in our
model, when two countries involve in a bilateral agreement, the non-member countries do
not face discriminatory tari¤s in export markets.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the N -country
model. Section III nds the optimal tari¤ rates and the best response functions. Section IV
extends the analysis by considering the stationary dynamic tari¤ game approach. Section
V concludes.
The Model
We extend the international trade model of Bond and Park (2002) by increasing the
number of countries to N in order to investigate possible regional and multilateral trade
agreements. In particular, our model is a N -good-N -country partial equilibrium model
where transportation costs are considered. In terms of notation, C = f1; : : : ; Ng represents
the set of countries and Hji is related to variable H in terms of good i 2 f1; :::; Ng in
country j 2 f1; :::; Ng.
The demand for good i in country j is given as follows:
Dji = j (A Bpji)
where we assume that the demand curve is downward-sloping and linear in price of the
3For a futher discussion on the relationship between preferential and multilateral liberalization see also
Bhagwati et al. (1999), Saggi (2006), and Karacaovali and Limao (2007).
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good.4 Similarly, the upward-sloping supply curve of good i in country j, which is also
linear in price of the good, is given as follows:
Xji = j (ji + pji)
where pji is the price of good i in country j, and j  1 is a parameter by which we measure
the size of country j. Note that in a special case of j = 1 for all j, we have N symmetric
countries with the same size.
Each country can impose specic tari¤s on its importables, with tjk denoting the
tari¤ rate imposed by country j for goods imported from country k (where tjj = 0 for all
j). Moreover, trade between any two countries is up to an exogenous symmetric iceberg
transportation cost, with  jk denoting the cost from j to k (where  jj = 0 for all j).
According to the supply and demand functions in each country, the autarky price
of good i in country j, pji (a), is given by the following expression:
pji(a) =
A  ji
 +B
We assume that ji  0 for all i and j; hence, the autarky price is positive for each
good in any country, i.e., pji(a) > 0. Moreover, in order to ensure that there is a single
exporter of each good k, we assume that kk   jk > ( +B) (tjk +  jk). That is, because
country k is the lowest cost supplier (including trade costs) of good i for all countries (i.e.,
pji(a) > pki(a) + tjk +  jk when i = k for all j 2 Cn fkg where Cn fkg is the set of all
countries excluding country k), country k is the single exporter of good i. Therefore, when
4See Gehrels (1956-1957) and Lipsey (1957) for early theoretical models that compare the implications
of zero elasticity of demand and non-zero elasticity of demand. Also see Panagariya (2000) for a recent
discussion on the implications of downward-sloped demand and upward-sloped supply.
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trade is achieved, we can write the price of good k in country j by the following expression:
pjk = min
i
pik + tji +  ji
= pkk + tjk +  jk
Note that if j = k, then trade costs are zero (i.e., tjk =  jk = 0), so that the price of the
domestically produced good is pkk = pjk in such a case.
The market clearing condition for good i can be written as follows:
NX
m=1
m (mk + pmk) =
NX
m=1
m (A Bpmk)
By using pmk = pkk+ tmk+ mk for all m 2 f1; : : : ; Ng, we can nd the source (i.e., factory
gate) price of good i in country k as follows when i = k:
pkk =
NX
m=1
m (A  mk   ( +B) (tmk + mk))
NX
m=1
m ( +B)
By the assumptions of the model introduced above, pkk is positive.
The volume of the imports of country j from country k is then given by the
following expression:
Mjk(pjk) = j (A  jk   (B + ) pjk)
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where
pjk = pkk + tjk +  jk
=
NX
m=1
m (A  mk)
NX
m=1
m ( +B)
+
(tjk +  jk)
NX
m=1
m  
NX
m=1
m (tmk + mk)
NX
m=1
m
=
NX
m=1
m

A mk
+B + tjk +  jk   tmk   mk

NX
m=1
m
Note that the derivative of pjk with respect to tjk or  jk is positive since j > 0 for all j;
i.e., destination prices increase in trade costs, and thus the volume of imports decreases in
trade costs (and source prices) and increases in country sizes.
In order to go one step further in our analysis, we need an objective function
for each country. The natural choice is, for sure, the national welfare function. Following
Bond and Park (2002), national welfare is dened as the sum of consumer surplus, producer
surplus and tari¤ incomes. As in the existing literature, we let each country to receive all
the tari¤ income for the good that the country imports. In particular, national welfare for
country j can be expressed as follows:
Wj =
X
k
"Z A=B
pjk
Djk (u) du+
Z pjk
 jk=
Xjk (u) du
#
+
X
k
tjkMjk(pjk) (IV.1)
where
R A=B
pjk
Djk (u) du is the consumer surplus for good k in country j;
R pjk
 jk= Xjk (u) du
is the producer surplus for good k in country j; and tjk = 0 if k = j, as before.
In order to analyze the optimal tari¤ setting behavior of each country, we rst nd
the optimal tari¤ rates and best response functions, then we employ a stationary dynamic
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tari¤ game. The details of the approach is given in the following sections.
Analytical Results and Best Response Functions
In this section, we show the implications of each countrys maximizing its welfare
given the tari¤ rate of the other countries. We provide a closed-form solution to the maxi-
mization problem of a country. Country j chooses the optimal tari¤ rate for good k for all
k 2 f1; : : : :Ng by
max
tjk
Wj =
X
k
"Z A=B
pjk
Djk (u) du+
Z pjk
 jk=
Xjk (u) du
#
+
X
k
tjkMjk(pjk):
The rst order conditions of the above problem gives us the best response function
of country j for good k. Given the tari¤ rates of countries other than j on good k, the best
response of j for good k is:
tBjk =
j
0@ NX
m2Cnfjg
m(mk jk)
(B+)    jk
NX
m2Cnfjg
m +
NX
m2Cnfj;kg
mtmk +
NX
m2Cnfj;kg
mmk
1A
0@ NX
m=1
m
!2
  2j
1A
(IV.2)
Therefore, the optimal tari¤ of each country for a good depends on the tari¤ rates of all
other countries for the same good. The closed-form solution is discussed in the next section.
According to this best response function, when a country increases its tari¤ for a particular
good, the optimal tari¤of other countries for that particular good also increases; i.e., there is
tari¤ complementarity. Furthermore, when a country changes its tari¤ rate for a particular
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good, the tari¤ rates of any country on other goods are not a¤ected.
Analytical solution: Nash Tari¤Rates
In this section, we provide a closed-form solution to a countrys welfare maximizing
problem. By substituting demand, supply, price, and import expressions into Equation IV.1
and solving for optimal Nash tari¤s for each country, we obtain the Nash tari¤ of country
j on good k (imported from country k) as follows:
tNjk =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
qjk   qjk
jCnfj;kgjX
i=1
0@(i  1) X
SiCnnfj;kg
 Q
t2Si
t
!1A
+
j
j
0@ X
m2Cnfj;kg
mqkm
0@1 + jCnfj:k;mgjX
i=1
0@ X
SiCnfj:k;mg
 Q
t2Si
t
!1A1A1A
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 
0@jCnfj;kgjX
i=1
0@(i  1) X
SiCnfj;kg
 Q
t2Si
t
!1A1A
 j
0@jCnfj;kgjX
i=1
0@i X
SijCnfj;kgj
 Q
t2Si
t
!1A1A
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(IV.3)
where
qjk =
 
NX
m=1
jm (mk   jk)
j (B + )
!
 
0BBBBB@
j jk
j +
NX
m=1
m
1CCCCCA+
0@ NX
m2Cnfj;kg

jmmk
j
1A
and
j =
2j 
NX
m=1
m
!2
  2j
for all t
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and Si refers to an arbitrary subset of countries with i countries.5 Set C is dened as the
set of countries which are not involved in a free trade agreement. By Equation IV.3, we
can nd the optimal tari¤ rate of any country for any good, given the tari¤ rates of other
countries. By substituting Equation IV.3, in the welfare function, the welfare function of
any country can also be obtained as a function of exogenous variables.
Comparative Statics for The Case with No Agreement
In order to understand comparative statics of optimal tari¤s, without loss of gener-
ality, we use the following benchmark parametrization of jj =  0:9, jk =  1, B+ = 0:2,
 jk = 0, N = 3, and j = 1 for all j. Although the scale of these parameters is not im-
portant, they are restricted in a way that is consistent with the assumptions of the model
introduced above. Nevertheless, for robustness, we consider di¤erent values of each para-
meter (that still satises the assumptions of the model), below.
The relation between optimal tari¤ rates and the relative size of country 1 (i.e.,
1), ceteris paribus, is given in Figure 4. As is evident, as country 1 gets larger (i.e., as
1 increases), its tari¤ on other two symmetric countries increases, tari¤ rates of other two
symmetric countries on country 1 decreases, and bilateral tari¤between other two symmetric
countries decreases as well. This result is mostly connected to increasing imports of country
1 and decreasing imports of other two symmetric countries which are important parts of
welfare through tari¤ income.
The relation between optimal tari¤ rates and remoteness of country 1 (i.e., 1j =
5For example, when we write
n 2X
i=1
X
SiCnfj:kg
: : :
we mean that the summation is for any subset of Cn fj:kg with i elements for all i = 1; : : : n  2.
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 j1 > 0), ceteris paribus, is given in Figure 5. As is evident, as country 1 gets remoter (i.e.,
as 1j =  j1 increase), its tari¤ on other two symmetric countries decreases, tari¤ rates of
other two symmetric countries on country 1 decrease, and bilateral tari¤ between other two
symmetric countries increases. In other words, as transportation costs increase between
country 1 and the rest of the world, other two symmetric countries become relatively closer,
and they apply higher tari¤ rates to each other compared to what they apply on the remote
country.
The relation between optimal tari¤ rates and comparative advantage of each coun-
try in the good that it exports (i.e., jjs), ceteris paribus, is given in Figure 6. As is evident,
as the degree of comparative advantage increases, all symmetric countries apply higher bi-
lateral tari¤ rates. This is again mostly due to increasing tari¤ incomes through increasing
volumes of trade.
Finally, the relation between optimal tari¤ rates and the slope of excess supply
with respect to price (i.e., B+) , ceteris paribus, is given in Figure 7. As is evident, there
is a negative relation between tari¤ rates of symmetric countries and the slope of excess
supply, mostly because of potential gains from additional tari¤ income through increasing
exports (and thus imports).
Figures 4-7 reect the trade-o¤ between many variables in terms of optimal tari¤s
because of their e¤ects on the volume of trade: (i) when Figures 4 and 5 are compared,
putting a tari¤ on a remote country has similar e¤ects as putting a tari¤ on a smaller
country; (ii) when Figures 6 and 7 are compared, increasing the number of countries has
similar e¤ects as decreasing comparative advantage of each country in the product that
it exports; (iii) when Figures 6 and 8 are compared, increasing the number of countries
has similar e¤ects as increasing the slope of the excess supply with respect to price. In
75
other words, just like Engel and Rogers (1996) measure the international border in terms of
distance, one can measure the international border in terms of country sizes, comparative
advantages, or transportation costs using the model of this paper when Nash tari¤s are in
charge. Such an exercise can be handled through an elasticity approach, i.e., by measuring
the e¤ects of country sizes, comparative advantages, or transportation costs on the elasticity
of demand and supply.
The results in Figures 4-7 are not a¤ected when we change transportation costs
(i.e.,  jks), comparative advantages (jjs), absolute country sizes (js) or the slope of
excess supply with respect to price (i.e., B + ), but the positions and magnitudes of
comparative statics change.
Comparative Statics for The Case with Trade Agreements
In this section, we analyze how the welfare of a country changes under possible free
trade agreements with di¤erent countries. Figures 4-7 reect that countries apply higher
tari¤ rates to countries that they have higher imports from. Although there can be many
di¤erent reasons to have high import volumes, in the context of regional trade agreements,
highest tari¤ rates would be applied on imports coming from closer countries, since the
volume of trade is higher with such countries due to low transportation costs.
We consider the benchmark parametrization of jj =  0:9, jk =  1, B+ = 0:2,
N = 3, and j = 1 for all j, and we change the remoteness of country 1 through its
transportation costs (i.e.,  j1 and 1j) which is used as a measure of distance. By using this
parametrization, we compare the welfare of country 2 when it makes an agreement with
country 1 (a remote region with a transportation cost of 21 = 12 > 0) with its welfare
when it makes an agreement with country 3 (a close region with a transportation cost of
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23 = 32 = 0). Formally, welfare gains of country j from a trade agreement between
country 2 and country 3 compared to an agreement between country 1 and country 2 is
given by the following expression:
j =Wj

tA23; t
A
32; t
B
( i)3; t
B
( i)2

 Wj

tA12; t
A
21; t
B
( i)1; t
B
( i)2

where tAmn represents the agreed tari¤ rate between countries m and n, which is set equal to
zero for simplicity, and tB (i)n represents the optimal tari¤ rates of other countries on good
n given the agreed tari¤ rates.
The welfare gains of a regional trade agreement between country 2 and country
3 compared to an agreement between country 1 and country 2 (i.e., j s) are depicted in
Figure 8. As country 2 is the one for which we make the comparison, we should focus on its
welfare gains: as is evident, as country 1 gets remote, the welfare gain of country 2 increases.
This is true mainly because of two reasons: 1) Increasing transportation costs between
country 1 and country 2 decreases country 2s welfare from having an agreement with
country 1, and 2) As country 1 gets remote, the tari¤ rate between country 2 and country
3 increases (Figure 5) and hence, the welfare of country 2 from having an agreement with
country 3 increases. This result is true for alternative parameterizations as well, although
the magnitude of welfare gains are di¤erent in alternative cases. When transportation
costs decrease (i.e., if countries are closer to each other), the welfare gains from a regional
trade agreement increase. As is also evident, the welfare gain of the world (i.e., the sum
of the welfare gains of all countries) also increases when transportation cost decreases. As
expected, welfare gains of country 1 are negative (and increasing with transportation costs),
while welfare gains of country 3 are positive (and decreasing with transportation costs).
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The Stationary Dynamic Tari¤Game
It is well known that repeated interactions between parties can be used to support
payo¤s that Pareto dominate those obtained in the one shot game. In this section, following
the lead of Bond (2001), countries play a repeated game for tari¤ rates. The repeated
structure of the game gives more exibility to our model in terms of incorporating the
self-enforcement agreements.
In this game, each country is able to compare future payo¤s out of a possible col-
lusion (cooperation) and out of a possible deviation from a free trade agreement.6 Country
js welfare when j makes an agreement with k is represented by Wj

tAjk; t
A
kj ; t
B
( i)j ; t
B
( i)k

where tAjk and t
A
kj are the agreed tari¤ rates for good j and k, respectively, and t
B
( i)j (t
B
( i)k)
is the optimal tari¤ rates of all other countries on good j (resp., k). If country j cheats on
country k, j sets its optimal tari¤ rate on good k, tBjk, given t
A
kj , t
B
( i)j and t
B
( i)k. In this
game, countries follow a grim trigger strategy, i.e., if country j cheats on country k, then
both countries set their optimal tari¤ rates in the future and no agreement can be formed
in the future.
In order to sustain collusion in a trade agreement, the trade-o¤ between the gains
from deviating from an agreed-upon tari¤ policy and the discounted expected future gains
from collusion must be balanced in a way that the latter should keep away countries from
deviating. That is,
1
1  jWj

tAjk; t
A
kj ; t
B
( i)j ; t
B
( i)k


8>><>>:
Wj

tBjk; t
A
kj ; t
B
( i)j ; t
B
( i)k

+
j
1 jWj

tBjk; t
B
kj ; t
B
( i)j ; t
B
( i)k

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6Although this paper investigates free trade agreements, the model of this paper can easily be used to
investigate custom unions.
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where j is the discount factor of country j. Hence, country j cooperates if and only if

j
1  j

	j   
j  0 (IV.4)
or equivalently
j  
j
	j +
j
where 	j is the one-period value of cooperation for country j, i.e.,
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and 
j is the welfare gain of country j from cheating to country k, i.e.,
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In other words, for country j to have a cooperation, the minimum discount factor of country
j should be:
j =

j
	j +
j
In our analysis, we calculate j values under di¤erent transportation costs to connect the
model to regional trade agreements.7
Trade Agreements in a Stationary Dynamic Tari¤Game
Consider the benchmark parametrization of jj =  0:9, jk =  1, B +  = 0:2,
N = 3, and j = 1 for all j, and we change the remoteness of country 1 through its
transportation costs (i.e.,  j1 and 1j) which is used as a measure of distance. By using this
7Note that both the welfare function and the minimum discount factor can be written as closed form
expressions because we already know the closed form expression of the best response tari¤.
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parametrization, we compare the minimum discount factor of country 2 when it cooperates
with country 1, say, 12 (i.e., a bilateral trade agreement) with its minimum discount factor
when it cooperates with country 3, say, 32 (i.e., another bilateral trade agreement), and
its minimum discount factor when it cooperates with countries 1 and 3, say, 1;32 (i.e., a
multilateral trade agreement among all countries). Such a comparison helps us understand
the di¤erences in sustainability between regional and multilateral trade agreements in a
stationary dynamic tari¤ game.
From Country 2s point of view, the relation between the minimum discount factor
of country 2 2 and the relative size of country 1 1 is given in Figure 9. Independent of
alternative parameterizations, it is seen that when countries are symmetric in size (i.e.,
j = 1 for all j), a multilateral trade agreement is harder to sustain for country 2, while
a bilateral trade agreement is easier. However, as country 1 gets larger, ceteris paribus, it
is easier for country 2 to sustain an agreement with country 1 (i.e., the larger country),
while it becomes relatively harder to sustain an agreement with country 3 (i.e., the smaller
country). Nevertheless, as country 1 gets large enough, the minimum discount factor of
country 2 in the case of an agreement with country 1 gets very close to the one in the case
of a multilateral agreement with all countries. This is mostly due to country 1 having a
larger share in the world economy as it gets larger.
From Country 2s point of view, the relation between the minimum discount factor
of country 2 2 and the relative size of country 2 2 is given in Figure 10. As seen in
Figure 10, as country 2 gets larger, both a bilateral trade agreement and a multilateral
trade agreement become harder to sustain for country 2. Moreover, as country 2 gets
larger, a cooperation in a multilateral agreement becomes relatively more di¢ cult to sustain
compared to a cooperation in a bilateral agreement.
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When countries are asymmetric in terms of their sizes, in order the check whether
a collusion is sustainable between asymmetric countries in general, we need to use the
maximum of the minimum discount factors of countries involving in an agreement; i.e., we
need to calculate max fj ; : : : ; kg where j; :::; k are the countries involving in an agreement.
Such an analysis is achieved in Figure 11. As is evident, when country 1 gets larger, a
multilateral or a bilateral agreement involving country 1 (i.e., the large country) is harder
to sustain, because the gains in terms of reduced tari¤s get smaller for country 1.
Figure 12 investigates the possible implications of transportation costs in trade
agreements: It shows how the minimum discount factor of country 2 and the remoteness of
country 1 are related. As country 1 gets remote, cooperation in a regional or a multilateral
agreement becomes harder to sustain for country 2. A regional agreement with country 3
is still relatively easier to sustain for country 2. In fact, the degree of sustainability of a
regional agreement with country 3 is the least to be a¤ected by the remoteness of country
1. This is due to the fact that as country 1 gets remoter, trade volume between countries
2 and 3 increases, and hence, the gains from an agreement also increases. The degree of
sustainability of a multilateral agreement is still higher than that of a regional agreement
even when the regional agreement is with a remote country. This is the second main result
of this paper: Lower transportation costs play an important role in sustaining regional trade
agreements.
In Figures 13 and 14, we see that the comparative advantage of country 2 and
the slope of the excess supply, respectively, have no e¤ect on the minimum discount factor
of country 2. Nevertheless, a multilateral agreement is always more di¢ cult to sustain
compared to a bilateral agreement.
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Conclusion
This paper has shown that the existence of transportation costs may be a possible
reason for explaining why trade agreements are mostly regional by introducing anN -country
international trade model with di¤erent country sizes and comparative advantages. In a case
with no agreements, we show that the optimal tari¤ rates are decreasing in transportation
costs; i.e., closer countries set higher tari¤s to each other in equilibrium. If such high
tari¤s are reduced between closer countries, the welfare gain is shown to be much higher
compared to reducing tari¤ rates with a remote country; i.e., countries tend to make regional
agreements to maximize their welfare. Moreover, according to the best response functions
of countries, (i) as a country gets larger, other countries apply lower optimal tari¤ rates to
that country; (ii) as a country gets remoter from others, other countries become relatively
closer, and they apply higher optimal tari¤ rates to each other compared to what they
apply on the remote country; (iii) as the degree of comparative advantage increases across
countries, all symmetric countries apply higher optimal bilateral tari¤ rates; (iv) there is a
negative relation between tari¤ rates of symmetric countries and the slope of their excess
supply.
After that, we make a welfare analysis by using a stationary dynamic tari¤ game
approach and show that, for an individual country, (i) it is harder to sustain multilateral
trade agreements (compared to a regional one) when country sizes are close to each other;
(ii) it is more di¢ cult to sustain a regional trade agreement with a relatively small country
than a multilateral agreement when a relatively big country gets involved in the multilateral
agreement; (iii) it is harder to sustain a trade agreement when the country itself gets
larger; (iv) it is harder to sustain a multilateral trade agreement (compared to a regional
one) when a country gets larger; (v) lower transportation costs play a signicant role in
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sustaining regional trade agreements compared to sustaining multilateral trade agreements.
The results hold under alternative cases, which further support the analysis.
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Figure 4. Nash Tari¤ Rates versus the Relative Size of Country 1
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Figure 5. Nash Tari¤ Rates versus the Remoteness of Country 1
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Figure 6. Nash Tari¤ Rates versus Comparative Advantage
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Figure 7. Nash Tari¤ Rates versus the Slope of Excess Supply
87
Figure 8. Welfare Gains of a Regional Trade Agreement
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Figure 9. Minimum Discount Factor of Country 2 versus the Relative Size of Country 1
89
Figure 10. Minimum Discount Factor of Country 2 versus the Relative Size of Country 2
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Figure 11. Minimum Discount Factor for Collusion versus the Relative Size of Country 1
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Figure 12. Minimum Discount Factor of Country 2 versus the Remoteness of Country 1
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Figure 13. Minimum Discount Factor of Country 2 versus Comparative Advantage
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Figure 14. Minimum Discount Factor of Country 2 versus the Slope of Excess Supply
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